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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the characters of Titurius Sabinus and Quintus Cicero, as depicted by 
Caesar in his Bellum Gallicum, fulfill a narrative function that furthers the political aims of 
Caesar’s text. I start by arguing that there are three Caesars present in the Bellum Gallicum, 
employing Gérard Genette’s three definitions of “narrative” as a model: Caesar the historical 
author, Caesar the narrative voice, and Caesar the character. I also argue that Caesar the author 
writes in the “zero degree,” a term Roland Barthes created to describe a seemingly unadorned 
writing style. When characterizing Sabinus and Cicero, Caesar will occasionally break his degree 
zero style to pass judgment (frequently implicit rather than explicit) on the two men and their 
actions. Through this process Caesar establishes his narrative voice as an arbiter of proper 
military conduct: when an officer acts in accordance with what the narrative voice approves, he 
is shown to be successful in the field. This approach has allowed me to engage with, and 
advance, the scholarly approaches to Caesar undertaken in valuable recent monographs by Luca 
Grillo and Andrew Riggsby. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Table of Contents 
Chapter One: A Literary Caesar and his Narrated Officers 1 
Chapter Two: Introducing the Officers 18 
Chapter Three: Sabinus’ Success 23 
Chapter Four: Sabinus’ Failure and Cicero’s Success 32 
Chapter Five: Caesar-character and Caesar-narrator  58 
Works Cited                         70   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter One: A Literary Caesar and his Narrated Officers 
In his dialogue Brutus, Cicero presents the following discussion of Caesar’s style, 
focusing specifically on his commentaries: 
Tum Brutus: orationes quidem eius mihi vehementer probantur. compluris autem 
legi; atque etiam commentarios quosdam scripsit rerum suarum. Valde quidem, 
inquam, probandos; nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis 
tamquam veste detracta. sed dum voluit alios habere parata, unde sumerent qui 
vellent scribere historiam, ineptis gratum fortasse fecit, qui volent illa calamistris 
inurere: sanos quidem homines a scribendo deterruit; nihil est enim in historia 
pura et inlustri brevitate dulcius. (Brutus 262). 
 
Then Brutus said: “His speeches are highly praised, rightfully so. I have read 
many; and he also wrote some commentaries about his own actions.” “Greatly 
indeed,” I said, “do they deserve to be praised; for they are bare, upright and 
charmingly interesting, with every ornament of oratory removed, just like a cloak. 
But while he wished that others have readied things from which those, who might 
wish to write history, could take up the task, he perhaps made it a pleasing 
undertaking to the idiots, who would wish to burn them with curling-irons: he 
scared sane men, at any rate, away from writing; for there is nothing in history 
sweeter than pure and lucid brevity.”1  
 
Cicero, in responding to Brutus’ praise of Caesar’s speeches and acknowledgement of the 
commentaries, produces his own assessment of Caesar’s style—an assessment that initially 
seems positive. Describing Caesar’s commentaries as “bare, upright and charmingly interesting, 
with every ornament of oratory removed, just like a cloak” (nudi enim sunt, / recti et venusti, / 
omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta), Cicero imbues Caesar’s style—a sparse style—
with elegance by describing it with a tricolon, perhaps demonstrating his approval of Caesar’s 
style by praising it with a rhetorical flourish so commonly found in his own works. Cicero 
continues by drawing a contrast between Caesar’s abilities as a writer and the abilities of those 
who might wish to write a history of the Gallic campaign,2 finding Caesar’s work to outstrip any 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. For the text of the Bellum Gallicum, I am using the 2008 
Teubner edited by Wolfgang Hering.  
2 It is worth noting that there is a possibility that Cicero could be referring to Caesar’s Civil War commentaries, but 
as Garcea 2010: 111 argues, it is altogether more likely that Cicero refers to the Bellum Gallicum. 
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potential writer who might undertake the task.3 Finally, Cicero ends with the simple assertion: 
“there is nothing in history sweeter than pure and lucid brevity” (nihil est … in historia pura et 
inlustri brevitate dulcius). Cicero’s meaning seems initially clear: Caesar’s style is not only well-
suited for the genre of the commentary, but it might even surpass the genre of the commentary 
and rival works of history. No one dares follow Caesar’s commentary on the Gallic Wars with 
his own history, because Caesar’s style achieves the brevity that is so sweet in historiographical 
writing.4  
It is possible to doubt Cicero’s sincerity in this passage, however, particularly by 
questioning whether Cicero’s remarks are ironic and tongue-in-cheek. One recent scholar is 
inclined to argue that it is “hazardous to conclude that Cicero thought the Commentaries to be 
honest narrative worthy of pure praise,” with some concluding that his praise is outright irony—
derogatory irony.5 The bulk of this argumentation from recent scholars relies upon the fact that 
Cicero elsewhere describes good historiographical writing as elegant—at the very least, in a style 
with more ornamentation than Caesar’s brief style.6 It is altogether reasonable, then, that Cicero 
appreciates Caesar’s style, while finding the style itself to be lacking. Caesar excels in a style 
                                                
3 Hirtius echoes a similar sentiment in his preface to Book 8. As Kraus 2005: 98 notes, Hirtius and Cicero take their 
similar judgments in different directions. 
4 For a counter to the argument that the commentaries are written for the sake of providing a foundation from which 
others might write more fleshed-out histories see Kraus 2009: 160-161. She calls the notion that Caesar wrote the 
commentaries for others to expand on a Caesarian “pose.” While it is certainly true that commentarius is a much 
contested term (see Riggsby 2006: 133-150 for a recent in-depth discussion of the genre), it is not my concern here. 
5 The quotation comes from Powell 1998: 114-115, who notes that Cicero seems to praise Caesar, while remaining 
open to the possibility that Cicero’s comments are insincere. He does, however, dismiss the possibility that they are 
derogatory. In a similar vein, Garcea 2010: 112-113 argues that Cicero might be praising Caesar’s style—a style that 
Cicero does not particularly like. This seems like a reasonable reading; Cicero clearly recognizes the impressive 
nature of Caesar’s work, though he might not have a personal affection for it. See Kraus 2005: 98-99 and 111-112 
for a reading that understands Cicero’s assessment as more critical, derogatory and ironic. In contrast, see Adcock 
1956: 12-13, who thinks that Cicero is sincere in his praise of Caesar’s literary merits.  
6 For a full list of Ciceronian citations regarding historiography and style, see Garcea 2010: 111-113, particularly 
note 99 on pg. 111, which lists out the citations.  
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that Cicero would never adopt.7 On this interpretation, in describing Caesar’s style with a 
tricolon, Cicero demonstrates the effectiveness of rhetorical flourishes while complimenting a 
style for lacking them. Rather than seeing the tricolon as Cicero’s attempt to bolster Caesar’s 
stylistic reputation by lending him a literary helping hand, perhaps the figure is better construed 
as a game of literary one-upmanship. In light of the other writings Cicero produced about the 
connection between historiographical writing and elegance, this seems a more likely assessment 
of the tricolon. This supposition gains further credibility from the fact that the tricolon is 
particularly complicated. Starting with a simple first element, Cicero glosses nudi with the 
increasingly more complicated second and third elements (recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis 
tamquam veste detracta), making the tricolon an unusual, but still techinically correct, rising 
tricolon. In addition, dectracta is attracted into the gender of veste. Since it is a mark of high 
style to play with the gender of words, it is safe to conclude that Cicero, in approving of Caesar's 
bare style, shows his approval by means of a complex and un-Caesarian sentence.  
The content of Cicero's praise, however, poses an interesting question—a question that 
might help us develop a greater understanding of Caesar’s style. I return now to the tricolon in 
full: “Greatly indeed, I said, do they deserve to be praised; for they are bare, upright, and 
charmingly interesting, with every ornament of oratory removed, just like a cloak.” (Valde 
quidem, inquam, probandos; nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam 
veste detracta). In writing that Caesar’s commentaries are bare, upright, and charmingly 
interesting, Cicero glosses his description of what is “bare” as something that is “charmingly 
interesting.” This gloss is immediately followed by a second description of the commentaries as 
                                                
7 We might wonder why Cicero seems so forthcoming with his praise but reserved with his criticism. Powell 1998: 
114 offers two suggestions. First, he argues that Cicero might be hiding his criticism for fear of political retribution. 
Adcock 1956: 13 disagrees, arguing that this seems out of Cicero’s nature as a literary titan. Second, he argues that 
Cicero delights in punning on the potentially sexualized nudi, recti, venusti tricolon. Kraus 2005: 98-99 expands this 
argument by drawing connections between Caesar’s style and his licentious reputation.  
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stripped of all ornament. Thus Cicero poses a paradoxical question: How are we to understand 
the relationship between these descriptions? How can Caesar’s writings be both venusti and 
stripped of all ornament? This paradox seems to have haunted Caesarian scholars through the 
years. In the preface to his book Caesar as Man of Letters, F.E. Adcock sees the need to justify 
his book against those who are uninterested in a literary Caesar because his commentaries appear 
only to have a “practical purpose in schools.”8 To seek the same justification in the current realm 
of scholarship would be to pose a straw-man: there have been three major texts in the last twenty 
years that have paid close attention to the literary nature of Caesar’s work, not to mention 
numerous essays and articles.9 Nevertheless, I think it is helpful to continue to focus upon 
Caesar’s literary capacities, even though half a century has elapsed since Adcock started to 
rebuke the notion that Caesar is a “school-boy’s author.” Which is to say, we must ask ourselves 
how Caesar writes seemingly without ornament, but in a way that is still charmingly interesting. 
I seek to answer the question by examining the ways in which Caesar interweaves his style with 
a consistent attention to narratological structure and characterization. The primary method by 
which I will provide such an examination is by focusing specifically on Caesar’s portrayal of his 
subordinate officers Quintus Sabinus and Quintus Cicero. 
In approaching Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum as a literary text worthy of literary 
consideration, I am indebted to two recent texts, Luca Grillo’s The Art of Caesar’s Bellum 
Civile: Literature, Ideology, and Community and Andrew M. Riggsby’s Caesar in Gaul and 
Rome: War in Words. In his book, Grillo argues that for all the pejorative classifications and 
simplistic readings that the Bellum Civile has suffered in the past, it is actually an artfully 
                                                
8 Adcock 1956: vii. 
9 The three are Welch and Powell 1998, Riggsby 2006, and Grillo 2012. In addition, Krebs and Grillo together have 
a forthcoming Cambridge Companion to Caesar that is entirely devoted to Caesar as author. Brown 2013: 42 
describes the current state of Caesarian studies as approaching the text with the assumption “that nothing is included 
without deliberation and design, to convey inexorably the author’s personal interpretation of events.”  
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constructed book that exploits literary techniques for the sake of engaging in a “contemporary 
political debate.”10 Just because the BC may advance an ideological program does not mean, for 
Grillo, that it is without literary merit—its literary merit may, in fact, derive from how artfully 
and persuasively it entices its readers. By tracking intra- and intertexual references in the BC and 
by highlighting Caesar’s narratological devices (such as focalization), Grillo concludes that “the 
BC in fact is not a piece of propaganda, but a work of literature.”11  I would like to employ a 
similar approaching in my reading of the BG.  
Riggsby, like Grillo, emphasizes the role of inter- and intratextual references in Caesar’s 
work, most specifically in the BG. In doing so, he sets an invaluable historical, political, and 
literary context for our understanding of the text. I, by working within the external contexts that 
Riggsby establishes in his book, seek to bolster, expand, or enhance certain internal readings 
Riggsby performs of the BG.12 By establishing and emphasizing a relationship between the inter- 
and intratextual references in the BG, Riggsby effectively demonstrates the literary nature of 
Caesar’s commentaries, in ways similar to Grillo. Moreover, just as Grillo applies certain 
techniques of literary analysis to the BC, Riggsby too approaches Caesar’s work with theoretical 
perspectives in mind, thus demonstrating not only the feasibility but also the immense value of 
reading Caesar in conjunction with a literarily-informed theoretical perspective. In the case of 
both books, a theoretical approach provides a persuasive vantage point from which both authors 
can argue that Caesar’s works are literary, thus augmenting the other points (such as political 
points) that each author makes about Caesar’s texts. Both books, however, share one weakness. 
                                                
10 Grillo 2012: 6.  
11 Grillo 2012: 7. He finishes the quotation with “and in literature allusions can count as political gestures and 
advance an ideological program,” thereby effectively demonstrating the tie between a rhetorical technique and its 
political ramifications in contemporary political debate. For contemporary claims that Caesar’s commentaries 
constitute propaganda, see Goldsworthy 1998: 193-195. 
12 Riggsby 2006: 1 claims that his “study has two roughly equal parts,” one of which is external and thus examines 
the historical, political and literary contexts of the BG, the other of which is internal and provides interpretive 
readings of the BG itself. 
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Neither author pairs frequent and sustained close-readings with their theoretical approaches. 
While both scholars do provide quotations as evidence of certain points, they do so with a degree 
of infrequency compared to how often they rely upon abstract argumentation that is based upon 
their theoretical approaches. I would argue, however, that a literary Caesar is apparent not only 
on the abstract level of thought but also at the level of the individual word.13 By examining both, 
one can most effectively bring to a close the traditional claims of literary shortcomings that 
Adcock started to dispel half a century ago while also providing in-depth arguments about 
specific aspects or portions of Caesar’s texts. 
The specific approach by which I will demonstrate Caesar's literary nature was inspired 
by Kathryn Welch’s 1998 article, “Caesar and his Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries.” 
Welch introduces her discussion of Caesar’s treatment of his officers with the subsection, “The 
purpose of the Gallic Commentarii.” She argues that the BG was a tool for Caesar during his 
time in Gaul to maintain his political position in Rome.14 By assigning a purpose to the text, 
however, Welch limits the function that Caesar’s officers can play within the text: in Welch’s 
opinion, Caesar carefully constructs the representation of each officer according to the political 
benefits that can be accrued to himself from the relationship. The narration of each officer exists 
to enhance Caesar’s prestige. Because Sabinus is a military and political ally his successes in 
Book Three are, therefore, to be celebrated; by dying in Book Five, however, he gives Caesar the 
opportunity to cast him as a scapegoat for the disaster. In the aftermath of one of the largest 
Roman blunders in the Gallic Wars, somebody besides Caesar must take the blame, and Sabinus 
is the most convenient person due to his recent death. Since he has died, Sabinus cannot fight 
                                                
13 Brown 2013: 46 shows the value in closely reading a passage of Caesar’s Latin.  
14 Welch 1998: 85-88. 
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back against Caesar’s charges.15 Certainly the BG contains numerous elements of political 
outreach.16 I will argue such in the course of this thesis. The author of the text has carefully 
constructed it so that he can espouse certain ideological values that could have potential political 
benefits. This is where Welch’s contribution to Caesarian discourse is most valuable: she 
demonstrates that Caesar artfully writes toward a political ideology. Yet, by restricting her 
understanding of how the officers are portrayed, Welch limits the scope of literary elements 
present in Caesar’s narration of his officers. Welch has provided a compelling reading of 
Caesar’s officers as politically constructed characters. But she does so by limiting the role 
officers play in the BG to political pawns rather than expanding their role as literarily depicted 
characters with potent political implications. Caesar can, and does, reside in both the literary and 
political realm.17 Recognizing this duality opens the commentaries to a variety of new readings 
informed by the literary and by literary theory.  
I turn, now, to the literary method that will inform this thesis. I will make two arguments: 
1) although Caesar frequently writes with a style that might be aptly described as nudus, 
nevertheless he occasionally deviates from this bare style in moments of importance; and, 2) in 
these moments of deviation, Caesar creates a strong narrative voice that establishes a relationship 
                                                
15 It is worth noting, however, that Sabinus’ family and political allies back in Rome might not be too keen to accept 
Caesar’s representation of Sabinus the scapegoat. Part of Welch’s argument is that Caesar not only needs to 
maintain as allies his allies with him in Gaul (i.e. his officers) but also their allies in Rome. This is most clearly seen 
in her discussion of Quintus Cicero (see Welch 1998: 96-98). That she has not reconciled her reading of Sabinus as a 
scapegoat with her claim that Caesar portrays his officers in a politically convenient manner for all parties in Gaul 
and Rome is one of the limitations of her argument as it pertains to Sabinus’ characterization in the BG.  
16 Previous scholars have anachronistically applied post-WW2 notions of “propaganda” to Caesar’s work, though 
such a treatment is problematic for a variety of reasons. Grillo 2012: 2-6 demonstrates why the term should not be 
rigorously applied to either the BG or the BC. See too Welch 1998: 85-88 and Krebs 2014. Krebs, in particular, 
situates the BG within a larger, multimedia public relations outreach on Caesar’s part – and in doing so, he casts 
Caesar as uniting himself to larger democratic ideals, such as his role as a man of the people. Riggsby 2006: 210 
attempts to sidestep this problem by redefining propaganda as “any communication, regardless of truth value, that 
tends to shape the beliefs and values of its audience.” This definition seems to me, however, to be too broad.  
17 Grillo 2012: 6 puts it aptly, writing “Caesar simultaneously places the BC within the literary tradition and engages 
the contemporary political debate.” Riggsby 2006, like Grillo, inserts Caesar into a literary tradition, particularly 
through appeals to intertexts. For an examination of the BG’s relationship to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura see Krebs 
2013: 751-758. For more on intertextuality, see Genette 1997: 1-5. 
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between the historical Caesar who writes the BG, the Caesar who is the first-person narrator of 
the BG, and the Caesar who is the main character of the BG. In regards to the first point, I appeal 
to Roland Barthes’ book Writing Degree Zero, which posits a style of writing, called “writing 
degree zero,” that is strikingly similar to Caesar’s nudus style. Barthes argues that to write 
degree zero is “to create a colourless writing, free from all bondage to a pre-ordained state of 
language.”18 For Barthes, all of language—every word of it—carries cultural burdens that are 
rooted in its previous uses throughout time. As a consequence, writing degree zero is actually 
unachievable since language can never be divorced from its cultural burdens; some authors, 
however, can achieve something close to writing degree zero. Barthes cites mainly Albert Camus 
as an example, though Ernest Hemingway is also mentioned. Most writers, however, and in 
particular socialist realists—whom Barthes spends a considerable amount of his text critiquing—
write in such a way that makes the reader aware of the cultural burdens present in language. 
Writing degree zero does not strip language of these burdens, but it does momentarily trick the 
reader into forgetting about them. Caesar frequently strives for, or wants to appear as if he is 
striving for, a degree zero state of writing.19 Barthes would provide a good reason why: Caesar 
does not always want to call attention to the fact that his reader is reading a text composed by a 
specific man—especially since that man already brings heavy political implications to his text. 
Caesar wants his reader to slip into a state of experiencing events rather than reading them. 
Caesar’s writing employs degree zero to such an extent that he can pose as if he is not actually 
writing. Thus, moments of deviation from a nudus or degree zero style are not only impactful for 
an attentive reader but also of magnified importance. In this way, Caesar’s style is both literary 
and political. It is crafted and composed, not just written down, to promote a specific ideology.  
                                                
18 Barthes 1968: 76. 
19 Brown 2013: 44-45 writes that “Caesar, the Atticist, eschews an ornate and pathetic style.” 
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My second and principal point argues that deviation from a degree zero writing allows 
Caesar to establish a narrative voice that relates to the author of the text, the narrator of the text, 
and the text’s main character. When discussing the BG, I shall be continually distinguishing 
among three “separate” Caesars. There is Caesar the author and historical figure. He is the actual 
man composing the BG by putting stylus to tablet. The two I will most heavily discuss in this 
thesis, however, are Caesar the narrator of the text and Caesar the character in the text. It is, of 
course, tempting to assume that the narrator and the author are the same. For this thesis, 
however, we must make a distinction between the two. It may not always be appropriate to 
assume that the narrative voice is representing the author’s opinions. In addition, Caesar the 
author makes a distinction between the narrator of the text and Caesar the character. The narrator 
makes asides (such as the ever-present “as we mentioned above”) in the first-person, while 
Caesar the character is referred to in the third-person.20 Moreover, if the text were recited out 
loud, then the narrator of the text would seem to be the man actually reading the text aloud.21 
Thus, Caesar the narrator and Caesar the character must be kept separate. As I hope to 
demonstrate later in the thesis, the temptation to collapse Caesar the narrator and Caesar the 
character certainly exists. Frequently the author of the BG casts the narrator and character as so 
similar that the character appears to take on traits normally reserved for a narrator: he can be 
omniscient and move from location to location seemingly unhindered. This has clear 
ramifications for how we read these three Caesars—the more omniscient and militarily powerful 
Caesar the character appears, the more the reader attributes these qualities to Caesar the political 
and historical figure (sc. the author).  
                                                
20 Kraus 2009: 162 assigns the first-person voice to the narrator of the text, as well, and in doing so hints at the 
tripartite division that I make explicit here. She does not, however, make it explicit and thus does not tease out some 
of the major implications that I do in this paper.  
21 For the possibility of the text being read aloud, see Wiseman 1998: 1-7. 
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The three Caesars correlate to Gérard Genette’s three definitions of “narrative” that he 
presents in his book Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Genette argues that the word 
“narrative” (récit in Genette’s original French) has three distinct usages. He defines them and 
provides the individual words he will use to distinguish between the three usages: First, there are 
the actual events that occur—or the signified events. Genette calls this the “story.” Any series of 
corresponding events can constitute a story. Second, the telling (or writing) of the story—or the 
act of producing the signifier/signified binary is called “narrating.” And finally, Genette labels as 
“narrative” the relational aspect between “story” and “narrating”—or the signifying narrative 
statement. All three aspects are relational, and the remainder of Genette’s book explicates the 
relationships among the three, though he pays primary attention to the third definition, 
“narrative.”22 We can match up our three Caesars to these three categories. Caesar the character 
is the signified, the “story.” Caesar the author and historical figure corresponds to “narrating.” 
He produces the text as its author.23 And lastly, the “narrative” of the BG occurs at the level of 
the Caesar the narrator—he is the signifier of the events in the text. The value of linking our 
three Caesars to Genette’s three definitions of narrative lies in how well Genette’s definitions 
demonstrate that all three elements are distinct, yet highly relational. We can recognize that all 
three Caesars exist and operate on different planes. Their modes of action, be it producing, 
signifying, or being signified, all operate uniquely and yet dependently. In exploiting this 
relationship between the three, primarily by conflating Caesar the character (the “story”) with 
                                                
22 For Genette’s full definitions of the three, see Genette 1980: 25-32. 
23 It is important to note that “narrating” can occur inside a text, and does so even in the BG. Genette, in defining 
“narrating” provides the example of Ulysses narrating his own story in Books IX-XII of the Odyssey. He later 
reiterates this point, on page 27, when he mentions that “narrating” is produced either “actually (Homer) or fictively 
(Ulysses).” While I recognize the complexity that this provides, even recognizing that it does occur in the BG (for 
example, whenever Caesar writes that he learned X, Y, and Z from a scout, he writes about an instance of 
“narrating,” even if the instance is brief), I think that such complexities ultimately detract from my overall point. 
The three Caesars are all distinct, yet highly interrelated elements that Caesar the author can manipulate for the sake 
of inflating the reputations of all three.  
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Caesar the narrator (the “narrative”) such that the former takes on attributes of the latter, Caesar 
(the author) artfully manipulates his multiform persona and his narrative schema in order to 
enhance his image as an accomplished military commander. Thus, this thesis will examine the 
relationship between “story” and “narrative,” in addition to looking at the relationship between 
one aspect of “story” (Caesar the character) and another (the officers). In fact, it is by first 
examining the relationships between the officers and both Caesar the character and Caesar the 
narrator that we can most fully appreciate the relationship between these two Caesars.  
Thus, I shall focus upon Caesar’s depiction of his subordinate officers, primarily Titurius 
Sabinus and Quintus Cicero, in an attempt to expand Welch’s basic premise discussed above—
namely that Caesar the author deploys his officers in order to bolster his military credentials 
within the text and his political ends outside it. I hope to do so by focusing upon how Caesar 
author employs a unique style (using Barthes as an aid) and narratological structure that develops 
relationships between Caesar’s officers and the three Caesars (using Genette as an aid). In 
addition, I will perform close readings of passages looking for certain literary techniques that 
Caesar utilizes. In my close readings, I shall follow Grillo in focusing on the intratextual nature 
of the text, since “intratextuality invites the reader to connect the dots that shape Caesar’s 
narrative.”24 Finally, my examination of the Caesarian officers will look at their implicit or 
oblique characterizations.  Caesar does not usually name explicitly the qualities that his officers 
exemplify, but instead implicitly characterizes each officer by showing him display whatever 
virtue or vice the narrator deems appropriate for the circumstance.25 
                                                
24 Grillo 2012: 6. Grillo, in turn, credits Damon 1994 for his decision to read the BC intratextually. For Damon’s call 
to read Caesar with a few literary perspectives in mind, see Damon 1994: 183-195. 
25 Vasaly 2009: 247-251 discusses Caesar’s characterization of Ariovistus, noting that Caesar mainly characterizes 
Ariovistus through “indirection.”  
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To demonstrate the presence of a unique narrative voice in Caesar’s writing and in the 
depiction of the relationship between Caesar’s officers and himself, I shall conclude this 
introduction with brief readings of two chapters. I take one from Caesar himself, and another 
from Hirtius, whose Book Eight of the BG provides a good contrast from which we can 
determine Caesar’s uniqueness. Hirtius admits the difficulties of writing Book Eight in his 
preface given the fact that Caesar’s style is so accomplished: 
Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua 
facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim 
Caesaris scriptis. Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse 
perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: qui sunt editi, 
ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium 
iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. Cuius tamen rei 
maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque 
emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus. Erat 
autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima 
scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum. (Book Eight, Preface 3-7). 
 
Would that those who will read [the continuations of Caesar’s texts] could know 
how unwillingly I have undertaken writing them, so that I might more easily be 
free from a charge of stupidity and arrogance, since I have placed myself in the 
middle of Caesar’s writings. For it is agreed by everyone that nothing has been 
completed so elaborately by others, which is not overwhelmed by the elegance of 
these commentaries: they have been produced, lest knowledge of such great 
things be lacking for writers, and to such a degree are they approved by the 
judgment of all that an opportunity [for expanding upon Caesar’s writing] seemed 
to be snatched away from writers, not given to them. Nevertheless, my admiration 
of Caesar’s writing is greater than others’: for others know, on the one hand, how 
well and correctly he completed them, but I, on the other hand, know how quickly 
and easily. For not only was the highest ability and elegance of writing in 
Caesar’s power, but also the truest knowledge of setting forth his own decisions. 
 
Ronald Cluett argues that Caesar’s continuators are literary continuators as much as they are 
political continuators while also noting that their work might have simply been rough drafts.26 It 
is clear that Hirtius writes in a manner that seems to be as degree zero as Caesar’s, though his 
ability to achieve it with the same degree of mastery is suspect. Hirtius himself, as is apparent in 
                                                
26 See Cluett 2009: 192-194, 196-197. 
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the quotation above, shows that he is aware of the difficulty of following in Caesar’s style. Yet, 
he does so anyway, prompting the reader to make comparisons between the texts. In turn, since 
Hirtius writes about the same subject and with a seemingly similar style, the difference between 
the two authors shows how Caesar develops his style and narrative.27 Hirtius depicts Caesar’s 
subordinate officers in two different ways. First, he mentions the legate in charge when troops 
are moved, occasionally by writing out the officer’s full name, as if Hirtius organized the 
structure of the book around where each officer was at any point in time.28 Second Hirtius shows 
officers utilizing the military and strategic maneuvers that Caesar approved of them using in the 
first seven books. While Caesar couches his depiction of the officers within a framework of 
military thought that he constructs in relation to and by means of the officers’ actions, Hirtius 
deploys the officers about which he writes without creating a unique narrative voice.29 As a 
consequence, Hirtius does not develop a relationship between the officer and the narrator, since 
the narrative voice in Book 8 is muted. 
This is in contrast to Caesar’s earlier narrative voice. To demonstrate this point, I turn to 
8.27, in which Hirtius relates the successful exploits of the legate Gaius Fabius, demonstrating 
his continuous successes with little overt intervention from the narrator: 
                                                
27 Welch 1998: 58 writes that Book Eight might be “arguably the most boring book in the Caesarian corpus” since—
in comparison to Books One through Seven—“it is possibly a more realistic description of the manoeuvres and 
difficulties of the Gallic campaigns and the role of the legates within that process.” While I disagree with her 
assessment that the book is boring, I think Welch’s point that Book Eight depicts the more mundane activities of the 
legates than the earlier books is pertinent. Hirtius is more interested in describing what happened than shaping how 
his readers should respond to how he is describing what happened. He does not, as Welch 1998: 58 says of Caesar, 
“[employ] on occasion the highest form of literary art.”  
28 It is true that Caesar also writes out an officer's first name upon mentioning him for the first time. After that, 
however, it is rare for Caesar to mention the officer by his full name so long as the officer remains within the 
narrative. Hirtius, however, will mention an officer by his full name throughout the course of a narrative, even if at 
other times he does not. When transitioning between different narrative episodes, moreover, Hirtius also 
occasionally includes paragraphs that reiterates where each officer was, referring to them by their full names. See, 
for example, 8.24. 
29 It is worth mentioning that Hirtius is likely deferring to Caesar’s narrative voice that he developed in Books 1-7. 
In this way, he would be a “true” continuator.  
 14 
Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit, obsidibus 
firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur. 
Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus 
adventu Fabii cognito desperata salute, si eodem tempore coactus esset [et 
Romanum] externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente 
ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine 
Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset. 
Fabius etsi nondum in conspectum hostium venerat neque se cum Caninio 
coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab iis, qui locorum noverant naturam, potissimum 
credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. Itaque cum 
copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum praecedere ante agmen 
imperat legionum, quantum, cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in 
eadem se reciperet castra. Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, 
invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere 
adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt 
in castra. (8.27.). 
 
At the same time, Gaius Fabius, the legate, received several states into an alliance, 
confirmed [the union] with hostages, and learned from a letter from Gaius 
Caninius Rebilus about what was happening among the Pictones. When he 
learned these things, he set out to bring help to Duratius. But, when Dumnacus 
learned about the arrival of Fabius, fearing for his safety, if at the same time he 
would be compelled to resist an external enemy force of Romans and to consider 
cautiously the townspeople, he suddenly left from that place with his troops and 
thought that he would not be safe enough, unless he had led his troops across the 
Liger river, which needed to be crossed with a bridge on account of its magnitude. 
Fabius, although he had not yet been seen by the enemy and had not joined 
himself to Caninius, nevertheless, having learned from those who knew the nature 
of the places, believed most strongly that the enemy, terrified, would seek that 
location that they were in fact seeking. And thus, with his troops, he strove for the 
same bridge and he ordered that the cavalry proceed in front of the column of the 
legions as far as they could go forth without the exhaustion of the horses 
[stopping them] from bringing themselves back into the same camp. Our cavalry 
followed, as had been ordered, and attacked the line of Dumnacus and, having 
attacked the fleeing and terrified men, under baggage, on the road, they obtained a 
great amount of booty with many men killed. Thus, when things went their way, 
they took themselves into camp. 
 
Undoubtedly, Fabius achieves a lot in this chapter, without making any sort of misstep or 
mistake that could blemish his record as a successful legate. In fact, the chapter reads like a list; 
the first sentence, in particular, presents a factual account of Fabius’ actions in which he accepts 
states as allies, which is solidified by hostages, and then receives intelligence from Gaius 
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Caninius Rebilus. This set of actions establishes the tone for the rest of the chapter – Hirtius will 
present what Fabius did and what consequences they entailed for Caesar’s army. One 
consequence is that Dumnacus fears both the Romans from without and the townspeople near 
him, who might revolt in loyalty to the Romans. This fear forces him to change position. In 
response, Fabius takes the appropriate action: he consults his sources to learn about the 
surrounding terrain (doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum), correctly guesses 
the mental state of the enemy (hostes perterritos), acts upon this knowledge (Itaque cum copiis 
ad eundem pontem contendit), and trusts in his cavalry to follow the enemy in a judicious 
manner such that victory is achieved. This last action on Fabius’ part—trusting in the cavalry—
echoes Caesar’s interest in depicting the Roman military’s chain of command—an interest that I 
will highlight below when both Sabinus (in Book Three) and Quintus Cicero (in Book Five) 
follow the chain of command. There is no innovation from Hirtius, though. Even though he 
adheres to themes that Caesar creates in his writings of the Gallic Wars, it is precisely this 
adherence to Caesar that differentiates him from Caesar; where Caesar creates, Hirtius 
reproduces.  
 Hirtius only depicts the proper military actions that Fabius undertakes and does not 
establish a larger thematic context in which this proper military action is undertaken. Caesar, in 
contrast, develops theme within narrative. 
Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua 
virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem, quid sine 
imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent, 
perspici cuperent. Tan<d>em confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt. Quorum 
magno numero interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. 
Quibus fortiter resistentibus vineas turresque egit. Illi alias eruptione temptata, 
alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis—cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi 
Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt—, ubi 
diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad 
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Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt. Qua re impetrata arma 
tradere iussi faciunt. (3.21). 
 
The battle raged for a long time and fiercely, since the Sotiates, trusting in earlier 
victories, were thinking that the safety of all of Aquitania was placed in their 
virtue, whereas our men were eager to show what they were able to do under the 
command of their young leader [Crassus] without their commanding officer 
[Caesar] present and without the other legions. At last, the enemy, having suffered 
many wounds, turned their backs. With a great number of them killed Crassus, 
leaving his march, began to besiege a fortified town of the Sotiates. With these 
men resisting bravely, he led out the wicker-works and the siege towers. They 
(the enemy), attempting a sortie at one time and making tunnels leading up to the 
siege towers and wicker-works at another—in which thing they (the Aquitani) are 
by far the most skilled, since there are mines and quarries in many places among 
them—, when they understood that nothing would be able to be done by these 
actions due to the diligence of our men, [they] sent diplomats to Crassus and they 
asked that he receive their surrender. With this thing accomplished, they, having 
been ordered to hand over their arms, did what was ordered. 
 
Caesar writes about a specific situation with a generalized style so that it might be applicable to 
other parallel situations. The Sotiates, trusting in previous victories, assumed the defense of all of 
Aquitania, thinking that only their virtue would bring safety (Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti 
in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent). In contrast, the Romans desired to 
show their abilities under the command of their young leader and without their general and the 
other troops. In this specific context, it is easy to fill in the blanks. Crassus is, of course, the 
young leader. Caesar is the general. The generalized language makes the situation flexible; 
soldiers in any situation ought to desire to show off their abilities, especially if it accrues glory to 
their commanding officer and the general. The narrator, by depicting Crassus’ actions and his 
relationship to his soldiers, demonstrates his own capacity for making military judgments in 
situations in which they are confirmed as sound. Crassus’ actions confirm the generalized rule 
that the narrator puts forward as true. Because the soldiers want to fight for their commanding 
officer—as all soldiers should—they win the battle. Unlike Hirtius, who simply depicts Fabius’ 
cavalry as being loyal and then achieving victory, Caesar the narrator depicts a causal link 
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between following the chain of command and victory. This causal link, in turn, establishes the 
narrator’s voice as actively framing the depiction of an officer within a larger framework of what 
Caesar the narrator argues constitutes proper military action, as seen in the soldier’s desire to 
fight well on behalf of their young commander (adulescentulo duce efficere possent). It is proper 
for the soldiers to follow the chain of command; in fact fighting all the more bravely in order to 
make their commander look good. The narrator, though, reports this fact with generalized 
language, making the situation applicable to other similar situations. The narrator thus assumes 
the role not only of a story-teller (like Hirtius) but also as an arbiter of proper military conduct.  
Caesar’s version of an officer’s good deeds contrasts with Hirtius’ since it more openly 
demonstrates the appearance of a unique narrative voice. Frequently this occurs when the 
narrator makes generalized statements about how an officer ought to act in seemingly similar 
situations. When Caesar the narrator depicts an officer as working in conjunction with the 
narrative voice (by following the templates of proper military action described in generalized 
statements), the officer’s success in battle is won by means of the proper actions undertaken. In 
the following sections, I shall show examples of officers acting in conjunction with military 
standards that are approved by the narrator; I shall also show one officer, Sabinus, undertaking 
actions that seem to run contrary to what the narrator has shown to be correct. When the officer 
acts in accordance with the narrator, it has the effect of bolstering both the officer’s military 
credentials, since he is shown to have acted correctly, and the credentials of the narrator, who 
depicts the officer as enacting the sorts of actions that Caesar the narrator approves, thus casting 
himself in the role of portrayer of what constitutes proper military action in the BG.  
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Chapter Two: Introducing the Officers 
Two of Caesar’s legates face strikingly similar situations in which one—Quintus 
Cicero—succeeds and the other—Sabinus—fails.30 Cicero lives and saves his men; Sabinus dies 
and dooms his. Because my close readings will assume a degree of familiarity with both 
episodes, I will now briefly lay out the basic narrative points of each episode.31  
In Book Five, Caesar put different officers in charge of different camps in order to 
combat better the threat of grain shortages while he remained in Gaul, waiting until all the 
legions were settled and their camps fortified. He gave a newly enlisted legion and five cohorts 
to Sabinus and to Sabinus’ fellow legate Cotta. They wintered in the land of the Eburones. 
Cicero received one legion himself, which he led into the land of the Nervii. They wintered there 
(5.24). After the Gallic leaders Ambiorix and Catuvolcus incited a rebellion among the 
Eburones, the two men led their forces against Sabinus and Cotta, catching the Romans by 
surprise, but nonetheless were repulsed by Roman soldiers on the rampart and by Spanish 
cavalry (5.26). After the skirmish, the Gauls initiated a parley with the Romans. Sabinus sent a 
close friend to the parley, at which Ambiorix promised the Romans safe passage to either 
Cicero’s or Labienus’ camp should they leave (5.27-28). After a lengthy debate that pitted Cotta 
against Sabinus, the Romans set out from camp at dawn (5.30).32 On their march, the Gauls 
ambushed the Romans, and in the ensuing battle Sabinus fell into a panic and pleaded for mercy 
from Ambiorix. Responding to this appeal with an offer of parley, Ambiorix promised that 
Sabinus would not be harmed if he accepted the parley. Cotta refused to meet with an armed 
enemy (5.36). During the meeting, the Gauls surrounded Sabinus and killed him. Cotta was 
                                                
30 For the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to Quintus Cicero as, simply, Cicero. If his more famous brother 
should come up, I will make the distinction clear by calling him Marcus Cicero.  
31 See Adcock 1956: 40-41 for a brief recapitulation of the events.  
32 For a brief rhetorical analysis of 5.30, see Adcock 1956: 66-67. 
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killed in battle alongside most of the other soldiers, only a few of whom were able to escape and 
flee to Labienus’ camp (5.37).  
Ambiorix, elated at his victory, led his army to the Nervii and encouraged them to revolt, 
choosing Cicero as his next target of attack. Having joined his forces with the Nervii, Ambiorix 
attacked the Romans outside of the camp. They were repulsed by Romans on the rampart (5.38-
39). Beaten, Ambiorix and the leading Nervii attempted to persuade Cicero to leave camp using 
the same argument that had worked with Sabinus. Cicero, however, placed his trust in his 
fortifications and refused to leave. As a result, the Gallic forces surrounded the camp and 
initiated a siege (5.41-42). The Romans, though subsisting on dwindling supplies and sustaining 
a considerable number of wounds, continued to withstand the siege and rebuff any Gallic 
attempts to take the winter quarters by force. Finally, one of Cicero’s camp-followers, a Nervian 
named Vertico, convinced one of his slaves to take a message to Caesar. Because the slave was a 
Gaul, he was able to mingle with the other Gauls, arousing no suspicion as he made his way to 
Caesar (5.45).  
When Caesar learned about Cicero’s circumstances, he commenced with setting up plans 
for rescuing his officer. After rearranging where certain legates were deployed and what troops 
they commanded, he met up with some additional forces and marched toward Cicero’s camp. 
Upon drawing near to the camp, Caesar sent a Gaul with a letter for Cicero. Because the 
messenger feared drawing too close to the camp, he put the message on a spear and flung it 
toward Cicero’s winter quarters (5.48). After receiving it three days later, Cicero and his men 
were elated by Caesar’s arrival (5.48). The Gauls, upon learning that Caesar was drawing close 
with reinforcements, left the siege and turned toward Caesar’s army. Caesar, knowing that 
Cicero and his men were safe, moved to a safe distance, set up fortifications, and pretended to be 
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afraid in order that he might lure the Gauls into attacking him on favorable terrain for the 
Romans (5.50). After defeating the Gauls via his ruse, Caesar returned to Cicero’s camp and 
congratulated the officer and his men for their courage under intense pressure (5.52).33  
Without anticipating too sharply—and without the requisite evidence—arguments that I 
will make below, I hope it is clear that the episodes summarized above fulfill the goals of this 
paper. First, they look specifically at two officers in the BG, offering a developed series of 
narratives for examination.34 Second, the episodes establish a relationship between themselves 
(one being Sabinus’ failure, and the other being Cicero’s success). And third, they place the 
officers within a relational context to Caesar the character (and, as I hope to prove with my close 
readings below, within a relational context to Caesar the narrator). I wish to focus right now 
upon my first and second points.  
The narrative similarities become readily apparent when compared side-by-side: 
Sabinus confronted by enemy (5.26). Cicero confronted by enemy (5.39).  
Sabinus leaves camp, encouraged by enemy 
(5.31). 
Cicero maintains his position in camp, 
attempting to send a dispatch to Caesar 
unsuccessfully (5.40). 
Sabinus is offered the opportunity to parley 
(5.36). 
Cicero is offered the opportunity to parley 
(5.41).  
Sabinus accepts the offer and meets with 
armed enemies although he is unarmed (5.37). 
Cicero continues to stay in camp, and a loyal 
Nervian sends a slave to Caesar with a 
message (5.42-45).   
Sabinus is killed (5.37). Cicero is rescued by Caesar (5.52). 
 
The two officers respond to their respective sieges differently, with the result that one man lives 
and one dies. In the process, Cicero saves his men and Sabinus fails his. Our interest, then, is in 
                                                
33 Holmes 1911: 105-118 contains an account of these episodes. 
34 I will not be focusing on the role of Cotta, though occasionally he will provide such suitable evidence that I will 
highlight some of his actions. 
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how Caesar the narrator draws similarities between the episodes and how he highlights contrasts. 
By presenting the two episodes in such a similar manner, Caesar (as narrator) invites these 
comparisons. These comparisons, in turn, encourage the reader to draw connections between the 
two officers. The narrator takes historical figures and makes them characters in a narratological 
system in which the actions of each character are presented in such a way that he guides the 
reader to draw certain connections between them. While each officer has a connection to the 
other a character, he also has a connection to the narrator of the text. This latter relationship 
becomes most apparent when we examine in context Sabinus’ failure and Cicero’s success.  
In order to understand how and why Sabinus fails in Book Five and how and why Cicero 
succeeds, a model of success upon which to base our evaluations is needed. Sabinus’ actions in 
warding off a Gallic siege in Book Three provide logical foundations. It is worth considering the 
Sabinus episodes together for three reasons: first, the main character, Sabinus, is the same; 
second, both situations share strong narrative connections in that both depict Gallic sieges on 
Roman encampments; and third, Caesar’s narrative voice is prominent in both—a point I hope to 
demonstrate in my close readings below. In analyzing the Sabinus narrative in Book Three, I will 
be arguing that his success is predicated on certain actions that he undertakes—actions that 
Caesar-narrator establishes through a distinct narrative voice when telling the story.35  
Sabinus undertakes responsible action by 1) trusting in his superior tactical position, by 
2) maintaining a strategically effective relationship with the enemy, and by 3) adhering to 
established military precepts, which most frequently manifests itself in his decision to follow the 
chain of command. In following these three key military dictates, as established by the narrative 
voice, Sabinus succeeds in warding off the Gallic siege. Yet, it is precisely by ignoring the same 
                                                
35 For ease, I will refer to “Caesar as narrator” or “Caesar the narrator” as “Caesar-narrator.” The same will be true 
for “Caesar-author” and “Caesar-character.” They will be shorthand for “Caesar as author” or “Caesar the author” 
and “Caesar as character” or “Caesar the character” respectively.  
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strategically valuable guidelines that Sabinus dooms himself and his men later. Cicero, however, 
reaffirms the value of following this specific course of action in Book Five by obeying these 
guidelines in his own defense against a Gallic siege. These three components of successfully 
defending against a siege will inform our understanding of what constitutes success and what 
constitutes failure.  
The actions described in Book Three occur during 56 BCE. In it, Caesar recounts 
Sabinus’ defeat of Viridovix, who was a leader of the Venelli and who swayed a great multitude 
of brigands to attack the Romans for the sake of plunder (3.17). During this year, Caesar was 
absent from Gaul, thus forcing Sabinus (and other legates) into positions of greater authority.36 
Viridovix, upon deciding to attack Sabinus’ camp, took the field on a daily basis, daring 
Sabinus to leave camp, to form ranks, and to attack. Sabinus, instead of giving in to these 
opportunities to attack, acts as if he were afraid of the enemy, putting on such a persuasive acting 
performance that even his own men started mocking him (3.17). This pretense of fear and the 
fact that Sabinus sent a loyal Gaul to lie to Viridovix combined to entice the Gauls into attacking 
(3.18). Viridovix and his band rushed toward the Roman camp with such speed over so great a 
distance that by the time they reached the Roman camp they were tired. Sabinus and his soldiers 
then won the battle decisively. The Venelli turned and fled almost immediately, and they were 
easily chased down by the Roman infantry and the Roman cavalry (3.19).37 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Welch 1998: 91-92 offers political reasons for his absence, namely that he had to strengthen his alliance with the  
other members of the triumvirate and, citing Dio (39.23.4), she also suggests that Caesar helped Clodius with his  
political machinations.  
37 Holmes 1911: 91-92 also provides an account of this event. 
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Chapter Three: Sabinus’  Success 
Caesar-narrator, in depicting Sabinus’ besiegement, portrays Sabinus as paradigmatic of a 
successful officer because he follows the three criteria of success I listed above. In Caesar’s 
introduction to the siege, all three elements of Sabinus’ success are elucidated by Caesar-
narrator. I will start by detailing how Sabinus fulfills the first of the three elements by 
maintaining his position in a strategically advantageous position in a fortified, Roman camp: 
Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra 
eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi 
potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, 
sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus nonnihil carperetur; tantamque opinionem 
timoris praebuit, ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent. Id ea de 
causa faciebat, quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui 
summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato 
dimicandum non existimabat. (3.17.5-7.) 
 
Sabinus was holding himself in a camp in a location well-suited in all respects, 
although Viridovix had encamped across from him at a distance of two miles and 
daily was presenting an opportunity for fighting by leading his troops out, so that 
not only now was Sabinus coming into the enemy’s contempt, but he was also 
chipped at by some remarks of our own soldiers; he presented so great an 
impression of fear that now the enemy dared to approach the rampart of the camp. 
He [Sabinus] was acting this way for this reason, namely that he did not think that 
a subordinate officer ought to engage with so great a multitude of the enemy, 
especially with the man who holds supreme military command absent, unless he 
could engage on equal ground or some other opportunity came about.  
 
From the initial words that Caesar-narrator writes about the siege, it is clear that Sabinus is in a 
well-fortified position. His camp, particularly its location, is well-suited for any circumstance 
that might arise, even though Viridovix had a camp nearby. In describing the Gallic attack on the 
camp, Caesar-narrator provides further information: “The location of the camp was on a hill that 
sloped up, little by little, for about a mile” (Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo 
adclivis circiter passus mille) (3.19.1). In placing himself on the high ground, a position Caesar 
covets time and time again, Sabinus situates his forces in a position such that they have a likely 
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chance of success.38 Then, he maintains that chance of success by holding the position and 
trusting in the location of his camp and its fortifications.39 As Caesar writes, “Viridovix … daily 
was presenting an opportunity for fighting with his troops led out.” By starting the cotidieque... 
faceret clause with the temporal adverb cotidie, Caesar emphasizes how often Sabinus could 
have decided otherwise: the opportunity was not just given once, and Sabinus’ continuous 
prudence shines forth due to the narrator’s syntactic presentation of the event.40 Here, the 
narrator and Sabinus act in conjunction, or—at least—Sabinus acts in conjunction with the 
narrator’s judgment: Sabinus does what the narrator implicitly argues that he should. This type of 
implicit narratological approval—and it need not be approval; there is narratological disapproval 
of Sabinus’ action in Book Five—is a mainstay of Caesar’s narrative voice, and Caesar-narrator 
employs it frequently in order to characterize his officers, as he does so with Sabinus here. This 
implicit characterization, or oblique characterization, strengthens Caesar-narrator’s depiction of 
Sabinus’ success: Sabinus succeeds in warding off a Gallic attack due to his superior position.41 
This much is, at least in the world of the Gallic campaigns, historical fact for the narrative.42 But, 
                                                
38 We need only to look to Caesar’s actions in the Battle of Gergovia to see how much of a priority the high ground 
was to the general. On multiple occasions, he uses baiting maneuvers to pull enemy forces off the high ground—
either in battle or before battle (see 7.45-51 and 7.37. respectively). Goldsworthy 2000: 105, in fact, states that 
“before his [Caesar’s] battles we find the same cautious maneuvering to gain every slight advantage that we have 
seen from the third century onwards.” 
39 It is worth noting that Caesar orders Cicero to maintain his position in camp later in Book Six (6.36), since it had 
suitable defense-works (6.32). 
40 For another rationale as to why Sabinus (and Caesar) might consider staying inside the camp a safer alternative to 
leaving, see Riggsby 2006: 21-24 who argues that the Romans defined “inside” as inherently safe and “outside” as 
threatening in respect to space. If a territory is within Roman control, it is safe. Sabinus—and other Roman 
officers—might think of his camp in a similar fashion.  
41 For more on oblique or implicit characterization, see Grillo 2012: 26-28. Grillo effectively shows that Caesar uses 
this technique to characterize his men on a regular basis in the BC. The characterizations can be both positive or 
negative.  
42 Grillo 2011: 249 asserts that Caesar solves the problems of truth “by not raising the question at all” in the BC. 
Grillo perhaps overstates this solution to a degree: surely Caesar has to reproduce something that resembles the truth 
since there were numerous witnesses to what was occurring—by writing about events that occurred, Caesar 
inherently raises the question of what actually happened. Yet, Grillo’s approach is helpful. Caesar-narrator writes in 
such a way that obscures the necessity of truthfully representing historical reality behind the primacy of narrative 
reality. See Collins 1952: 87-88 for the assertion that parts of the Sabinus narrative must have been “supplied by 
Caesar’s imagination.”  
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by bolstering this telling with a narrative voice that indicates approval for his actions—in 
contrast to a lack of a narrative voice, as in the Hirtius passage examined above—Caesar-
narrator establishes a relationship between the character and the narrator. This relationship 
consists of a mutually agreed upon approach to a strategic problem, and thus it denotes approval.  
The oblique characterization through an approving narrative voice can also be found in 
the second category of Sabinus’ success: the strategic relationship that he establishes with the 
enemy. By ignoring Viridovix’s daily approaches to the camp, Sabinus appears to be afraid of 
the enemy. This presentation of fear ultimately induces the enemy to attack on terms favorable 
for the Romans. By coercing the Gauls to attack because they think that their opponent is afraid, 
Sabinus ensures his success through a strategic decision to appear one way to the enemy. One 
might argue in contrast that Sabinus was actually afraid, and Caesar implies this fact. It is, of 
course, entirely possible and must be considered. I would like to suggest two responses to this 
reading, however. First, if Sabinus was actually afraid, then he had the good sense to manipulate 
that fear in order to encourage the enemy to attack. Caesar-narrator makes this clear by first 
logically connecting these two notions when he claims that “he [Sabinus] presented so great an 
impression of fear that already the enemy dared to approach the rampart of the camp” 
(tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent) 
and when he states outright that “he [Sabinus] was acting this way for this reason” (Id ea de 
causa faciebat). Moreover, Caesar-narrator also includes the anecdote that a few of Sabinus’ 
men were tricked by the performance. They carped at Sabinus for his actions. It is worth noting 
that the narrator in 3.17.5 implies that the soldiers were wrong to sneer at Sabinus.43 The 
parallelism of non solum … sed etiam shows the sneering soldiers in line with the enemy’s 
thoughts on Sabinus—an unflattering comparison for a Roman soldier. Moreover, the litotes in 
                                                
43 See Holmes 1911: 92, who asserts that Sabinus “was simply biding his time.” 
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nonnihil not only emphasizes that some men carped at their commanding officer, but also hides 
who these men were. By not identifying which men were sneering, the double negative suggests 
that the carping men sneered in quiet; they were not brave enough to organize a formal 
presentation of their displeasure. Caesar-narrator, therefore, demonstrates how successful 
Sabinus’ trickery was while not blaming the officer for actually being afraid or losing control of 
camp morale. In fact, the narrator seems to use this anecdote as a way to praise, implicitly, 
Sabinus’ control of his camp.44 Sabinus’ strategic relationship to the enemy was a gamble, 
primarily because of how his own soldiers responded to it, not the enemy. It was convincing 
enough that certain Romans were compelled to sneer at their superior officer. Yet, Sabinus could 
utilize such a strategic technique because he was confident enough in his command of his men. 
Caesar’s narrative voice, through inclusion of this anecdote and through parallelism and litotes, 
confirms that Sabinus made the right decision.45 
The third and final element of Sabinus’ success—that Sabinus acts prudently within the 
chain of command—has already found its way into my argument, since it is apparent even in the 
narrative of the first two elements of success. It is, for example, found in the word idoneo that 
starts the passage we have been examining thus far, with idoneo displaying the explicit 
suitability that the narrator finds in the location Sabinus has chosen for his camp. This suitability 
is further underscored by the fact that idoneo is in emphatic position, only placed after the 
necessary Sabinus. By making manifest his approval of the camp’s location, Caesar-narrator 
develops a relationship between himself and Sabinus—a relationship of approval. In his clear 
approval of Sabinus’ actions, commensurate with the situation in which Sabinus finds himself, 
                                                
44 As Adcock 1956: 56 puts it, Caesar gives his legates “the fullest credit for their consilia, for their adherence to the 
ratio belli.”  
45 Grillo 2011: 246 argues that Caesar-narrator in the BC can read people’s minds, understanding their mental states. 
The application of this characterization of the narrator to the narrator of the BG, in conjunction with Caesar-
narrator’s approval of Sabinus’ actions, suggests that Sabinus is indeed performing fear. 
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Caesar-narrator establishes himself as an arbitrator of proper military strategy: through his 
control of the narrative, its presentation, and its outcomes, the narrator has the power to establish 
key military priorities that ought to be followed.46 When he depicts an officer as following these 
military precepts, then that officer is—as in this case with Sabinus—rewarded with either 
implicit or explicit praise from Caesar-narrator. The narrator deploys a similar tactic a few 
sentences later when describing the man Sabinus sent to trick the enemy into attacking. After 
pretending to be afraid, Sabinus “chose a certain, suitable man, a crafty Gaul, from those whom 
he had with himself as auxiliary forces” (…idoneum quendam hominem et callidum delegit 
Gallum ex iis, quos auxilii causa secum habebat) (3.18.1). This Gaul, under instructions from 
Sabinus, gained access to the enemy camp and convinced them that Sabinus was afraid, that 
Caesar was in trouble, and that Sabinus would leave that night to come to Caesar’s aid. Here, 
again, the narrator approves of the action that Sabinus takes in the specific situation he found 
himself: when being besieged by an opposing Gallic force, it makes sense to trick the enemy by 
sending a loyal Gaul to spread misinformation. In this regard, the man Sabinus chose was, 
indeed, suitable. He fits the criteria that an officer would look for in a covert mission of 
dissimulation. The narrator confirms this with the word idoneum, the same word that Caesar-
narrator uses to describe the location of the camp.  
By no means is idoneus an uncommon word in Caesar’s body of work. In fact, Meusel’s 
Lexicon Caesarianum lists a plethora of usages in both the BG and the BC. Nowhere else, 
however, does Caesar use one form of idoneus so close to another as he does here, thus 
suggesting that the rectitude with which Sabinus acted is, indeed, satisfactory to the narrator. 
This suggestion is compounded by the nature of the adjective idoneus. Idoneus is an evaluative 
                                                
46 Grillo 2011: 253 calls the narrator of the BC a “military expert,” asserting that the narrator “overtly claims 
military expertise.”   
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adjective—it describes the nature of its corresponding noun by providing the judgment of the one 
who modifies the noun with the adjective. Unlike a basic adjective, like "large," which describes 
an intrinsic quality of a noun that should be apparent to every person, an evaluative adjective 
expresses how the speaker perceives the noun. Given Caesar-narrator's typically degree zero 
style of writing, evaluative adjectives indicate that the narrator is providing an opinion or an 
evaluation worthy of the reader’s consideration.47 Modifying a person or a location with the 
adjective ideoneus is surely not degree zero and thus represents a glimpse into how Caesar-
narrator thinks about Sabinus' actions and how he correspondingly wants his readers to think 
about these actions. In addition, an evaluative adjective presumes a shared body of knowledge 
that the narrator thinks his audience will share. Caesar-narrator assumes that his audience will 
understand why each noun that is idoneus is, in fact, idoneus. Thus, Sabinus can act quite well as 
an exemplum for us when evaluating his actions in Book Five, as well as Cicero’s and Caesar’s. 
Not only does the narrator approve of Sabinus’ actions, thus establishing a metaphorical 
chain of command—on display for the reader—between Caesar-narrator and Sabinus, but 
Sabinus himself recognizes that he must follow the chain of command by acting according to 
proper military precepts, which is the third criterion of success that I listed above. And, Caesar-
narrator, in relating Sabinus’ recognition of this fact, presents it in such a way that allows him to 
create another military guideline that Sabinus follows. I turn again to the last portion of the 
quotation we have been examining above, 3.17.7, which I quote here again for the sake of 
convenience: 
Id ea de causa faciebat, quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo 
absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data 
legato dimicandum non existimabat. (3.17.7.) 
 
                                                
47 Evaluative adjectives, when paired with the narrative structure in which they are deployed, come to represent what 
Brown 2013: 43 calls a “self-serving narrative choice.”   
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He [Sabinus] was acting this way for this reason, namely that he did not think that 
a subordinate officer ought to engage with so great a multitude of the enemy, 
especially with the man who holds supreme military command absent, unless he 
could engage on equal ground or some other opportunity came about.  
 
The ablative absolute and following relative clause (eo absente qui summam imperii teneret) has 
a clear referent from a narrative standpoint: Caesar-character. As readers, we are to understand 
that Sabinus did not want to act with Caesar absent. But rather than literally write “with Caesar 
absent,” Caesar-narrator instead uses the generalized eo. The pronoun eo has no clear 
grammatical referent, thus allowing the narrator to express this rule—that a subordinate officer 
ought not to act without permission from his commanding officer—as a general rule, thereby 
establishing himself as a creator of military guidelines and rules. The narrator controls proper 
military actions and rewards those who obey with narratological prominence and praise; those 
who disobey, like Sabinus will do in Book Five, may receive narratological prominence, but not 
the praise from the narrator that Sabinus here enjoys. In addition, the verb teneret may be an 
imperfect subjunctive in a relative clause of characteristic, thus making the sentence refer 
simultaneously to Caesar from a narrative perspective and to all other generals from a thematic 
perspective.48 Sabinus is likewise called a “subordinate officer” (legato), which emphasizes how 
his role in shying from rash action without a commanding officer present is likewise a general 
rule that could apply to any officer, not just Sabinus. Any legate in a similar situation as Sabinus 
ought to do as Sabinus did: act prudently and with proper respect for the chain of command. Not 
only is Sabinus correct in acting prudently, but so too should any officer act when seeking to 
terminate successfully the attack on an enemy. Here we see another melding of Sabinus’ actions 
                                                
48 It should be noted that the verb is in a subordinate clause in indirect speech, thus necessitating the subjunctive. 
But, I think it unreasonable to think that the rules of the subjunctive’s usage are so distinct that the flavor of the 
subjunctive in a relative clause of characteristic cannot be found in teneret.  
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with the narrator’s wishes: Sabinus succeeds as the idealized officer, a fact which Caesar’s 
abstract language confirms.  
Caesar’s presentation of Sabinus, through an oblique and implicit characterization that 
aligns Sabinus’ success with prescribed notions of proper military action, makes the narrator the 
arbiter of what constitutes the approved military framework in which Sabinus attains victory. 
Sabinus, by succeeding within the confines of what the narrator constitutes as proper, bolsters 
not only his position as Caesar's legate but also the position of the narrator as a shaper of proper 
military action. Sabinus, as he fights on the battlefield, is not conscious of how his actions will 
afford Caesar-author the opportunity to construct a narrative voice that posits proper military 
rules—or, if he is, it is a subordinated concern to the much more pressing concern of winning the 
battle. Rather, this opportunity manifests itself through Caesar-narrator’s presentation of 
Sabinus’ victory. The Roman military hierarchy enhances Sabinus’ virtuous actions. Riggsby 
argues that the BG understands virtue as an assimilated trait (the Gauls can learn virtue and act 
virtuously by observing the Romans, for example), but that the unique hierarchy of the Roman 
military best elicits virtue from its soldiers.49 Essentially, the effective establishment of a 
hierarchy that contains a strong commander and obedient subordinates provides the best 
environment for virtue. Caesar, thus, can take “credit for his troops’ actual fighting”50—as 
Adcock also asserts when he writes that “to Caesar the res gestae of his legati can be subsumed 
under his own res gestae.”51 Similarly, when a subordinate officer acts in the stead of Caesar, he 
can evoke virtue from the soldiers. In this way, Riggsby starts to describe the relationship that I 
am finding in my close readings of the text—the relationship in which the officer and Caesar act 
in conjunction with each other to achieve success. The major development that I am offering, 
                                                
49 Riggsby 2006: 83-105. 
50 Riggsby 2006: 104. 
51 Adcock 1956: 56. 
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however, is the inclusion of the narrator, and not just the character. Caesar-narrator plays an 
integral role in this relationship.  
Since I argue that Caesar-narrator presents Sabinus’ victory as a way for Caesar-narrator 
to cast himself as an arbiter of military values, I am presenting a dualistic reading. This dualistic 
reading understands the events of Sabinus’ victory as a way of characterizing Sabinus the officer 
and Caesar-narrator. In this instance, Caesar-narrator characterizes both himself and Sabinus in a 
positive manner. This dualistic reading, however, contrasts with Welch’s reaching, which sees 
this event as a “portrait [that] serves to alert us to the ways in which Caesar’s narratives suit the 
needs of the moment and are not always internally consistent.”52 For Welch, Sabinus, in as much 
as he is characterized, only exists as a “character” to serve the immediate narrative needs of the 
text. Thus, when Welch says that “[the portrait] also serves to demonstrate that caution and 
obedience, not initiative, are a Caesarian legate’s most important attributes” she can only mean 
in the context of 3.17-19. In fact, in her later analysis of Sabinus’ role in Book Five, she does not 
return to these attributes (or lack thereof) as this thesis will, instead reading Sabinus’ failure in 
Book Five as a politically convenient scapegoat for Caesar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52 Welch 1998: 93-94. 
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Chapter Four: Sabinus’ Failure and Cicero’s Success 
In Book Five, Sabinus finds himself in a similar situation to that in which he found 
himself in Book Three; Cicero, in Book Five, likewise finds himself in a similar situation to 
Sabinus' in Book Three. Due to these similarities, it is possible to evaluate their actions relative 
to how Sabinus succeeded in Book Three and in relation to each other. Thus, in this portion of 
the thesis, I will examine how effectively (if at all) Sabinus and Cicero 1) trust their superior 
tactical position, 2) maintain a strategically beneficial relationship with the enemy, and 3) rely 
upon established military convention approved by the superior commander (sc. Caesar-
narrator).53 On the one hand, I hope to demonstrate that Sabinus ignores the tactics that led to his 
earlier success, instead choosing to act in a manner nearly opposite from how he acted 
previously.54 Cicero, on the other hand, follows the model of success that Sabinus established in 
Book Three and that Caesar-narrator approved.55 He may follow the model literally—he would 
surely have heard how Sabinus defeated his enemy in Book Three, perhaps encountering the 
methods of Sabinus’ success similarly to how the reader would encounter them after the fact. 
With this in mind, I would like to examine Sabinus’ failure and Cicero’s success, treating each 
                                                
53 Mueller 2012: 79 notes that “Caesar remains a force throughout the narrative … of course, because he tells the 
story…” This part of my thesis attempts to tease out the implications that Caesar’s storytelling (which is to say, 
Caesar-narrator’s narrative voice) has for our understanding of Sabinus, Cicero, and both legates' relationship to 
Caesar-narrator.  
54 See Collins 1952: 89, who reads a similar difference between the Sabinus of Book Three and the Sabinus of Book 
Five—“two years later Sabinus has nothing in common with his earlier self except his name.” Notably, Collins 
1952: 90 argues that the contrast between the two depictions of Sabinus recall each other. Collins argues, however, 
that is constitutes “strong evidence that the account in Book III was written with the knowledge of the events of 
Book V.” There are other alternatives to this view, however. Caesar-narrator could be referring to his depiction of 
Sabinus in Book Three while writing Book Five in order to inform his later characterization of Sabinus, for example. 
Geltzer 1968: 171 argues that all seven books were published at once. So too does Adcock 1956: 83-89, though he 
does think they were written year by year, even if they were published all at once. Goldsworthy 2006: 187-188 
argues against the notion of singular publication. For another argument in favor of serial publication, see Wiseman 
1998: 1-7. See also Levick 1998: 65. 
55 If Cicero did have the opportunity to read (or hear, as is more likely in a military context) Caesar-narrator’s 
depiction of Sabinus’ action in Book Three and then follow his example, then this would constitute a literal example 
of Sabinus’ role as an exemplum. Even if Cicero did not, Sabinus’ actions in Book Three function like exempla if we 
apply the definition found in Stem 2012: 146. Stem writes, “actions become exempla when an author frames them as 
such within a set of exemplary templates.” Surely Caesar-narrator casts Sabinus as acting within the template of 
prudence, among others.   
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episode in respect to each man’s adherence (or lack thereof) to the three criteria of success rather 
than in respect to chronological order.  
Sabinus does not trust in the (apparently) superior position of his camp, leaving in the 
face of an imminent siege and at the urging of the enemy, even though he should have stayed. 
Caesar-narrator, after explaining that Caesar-character split up his forces in order to combat the 
grain shortage, makes it clear that Sabinus thought his camp was fortified, at least initially: 
Interim ab omnibus legatis quaestoribusque, quibus legiones tradiderat, certior 
factus est in hiberna perventum locumque hibernis esse munitum. (5.25.5.) 
 
Meanwhile, he [Caesar] was informed by all his legates and quaestors to whom he 
had given the legions that they had reached their winter quarters and that each 
location designated for wintering had been fortified.  
 
Since he is one of the legates who informed Caesar that his winter camp was fortified, Sabinus 
has no excuse for abandoning a fortified position, except in the direst of circumstances. Thus, 
either Sabinus’ camp was adequately fortified, thereby making his decision to leave the camp 
erroneous from the beginning, or—less likely—Sabinus has misled his general, violating the 
chain of command. Neither circumstance depicts Sabinus as a responsible legate, and by starting 
the narrative of Sabinus’ failure with this type of introduction, Caesar-narrator implicitly 
characterizes Sabinus as an irresponsible legate – especially after a second reading of this event 
or upon reflection after finishing a first reading.56 In this manner, at least, the moment Sabinus 
leaves camp, the unity between officer and narrator that occurred in Book Three is ruptured: 
Sabinus no longer works in conjunction with the narrator’s approval of his military actions. The 
implicit characterization that Caesar-narrator employs demonstrates his ability to depict his 
officers in a negative manner without attacking the men for their irresponsible actions. 
                                                
56 As Riggsby 2006: 94 notes, Sabinus does not provide “even a semblance of authority,” though he includes Cotta 
in this description, which unfairly equates Cotta’s role in the Romans’ defeat with Sabinus’—unfair because Caesar-
narrator casts Cotta in an altogether more positive light.  
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Reconstructing the actions of Sabinus and showing the reader why they were wrong is more 
important to Caesar-narrator than explicitly telling the reader. This allows him to pass judgments 
while maintaining a seemingly degree zero style: Caesar-narrator's objectivity remains intact—
Sabinus simply did the wrong thing and Caesar-narrator is reporting it.57 Part of the value of 
close-reading these passages with an understanding that Caesar-narrator's deviations from a 
degree zero style are worthy of attention comes precisely from the way close-reading allows the 
reader to understand how Caesar-narrator shapes the characterizations of each officer simply by 
reporting what happened in specific ways. Caesar need not be explicit because the power of his 
implicit characterizations is so forceful.  
The subsequent narrative indicates that Sabinus' report about the strength of his camp was 
accurate. Revolting Gauls, led by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, attempt to take the camp: 
Diebus circiter quindecim, quibus in hiberna ventum est, initium repentini 
tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco. Qui cum ad fines 
regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna 
comportavissent, Indutiomari Treveri nuntiis inpulsi suos concitaverunt subitoque 
oppressis lignatoribus magna manu ad castra oppugnanda venerunt. Cum 
celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque ascendissent atque una ex parte 
Hispanis equitibus emissis equestri proelio superiores fuissent, desperata re 
hostes suos ab oppugnatione reduxerunt. (5.26.1-3.) 
 
                                                
57 In contrast to the view that Caesar presents Sabinus’ missteps through a reporting of the facts and implicit 
characterization, see Collins 1952: 88-89. Collins argues that Caesar makes no effort to “palliate” Sabinus’ “errors,” 
instead selecting circumstances that “make him appear even stupider and less soldierly than he can in fact have 
been.” In writing that Caesar “makes Sabinus act with an incompetence so gross as to raise a serious question as to 
Caesar’s own good judgment in allowing such a man to exercise a position of responsibility,” Collins assumes that 
Caesar “makes” Sabinus take the wrong actions instead of the possibility that Sabinus made the mistakes himself. If 
Collins’ assumption holds turn, then I might question why Caesar’s good judgment is called into question. Caesar’s 
(the character, presumably, though Collins does not make it clear) good judgment cannot be called into question if 
the officer he put in charge did not actually do what Caesar-narrator later reports that he did. Moreover, Sabinus’ 
actions in Book Three warrant another command (as Collins himself notes on page 90 of his dissertation). It is worth 
noting that Collins does say later on the same page that he is not denying “the substantial historical accuracy of the 
records” from which Caesar is working; nor is he charging “Caesar with falsification,” ultimately concluding that 
the potential fragmentary nature of the materials Caesar must have had in regards to this episode means “we may see 
his creative imagination at work more clearly than in the rest of his narrative.” For more on whether or not Caesar 
should have given Sabinus command, see Holmes 1911: 118 n. 1, who concludes that though it “was necessary to 
employ him somewhere,” Caesar should probably not have given Sabinus this command.  
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About 15 days after the arrival into winter quarters, the beginning of a sudden 
revolt and defection arose, from the instigation of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. 
Although these men had been at hand on behalf of Sabinus and Cotta on the 
borders of their kingdom and had transported grain to the winter quarters, 
compelled by messages from Indutiomarus of the Treveri, they roused their own 
men and, after attacking suddenly our soldiers gathering firewood, they marched 
on our camp with a large band to attack it. Our men quickly took up arms and 
ascended the rampart, and with the Spanish cavalry sent out from one part they 
emerged the victors in a cavalry battle. When the enemy lost hope, they withdrew 
their troops from the attack.  
 
Ambiorix and Catuvolcus deceive Sabinus and Cotta, and in doing so, they launch a surprise 
attack, putting the Romans in as vulnerable a position as they likely could have. Sabinus and 
Cotta assume that the reason why the Gallic forces had arrived was because Ambiorix and 
Catuvolcus were at their service and providing grain. In fact, it seems as if that is initially what 
Ambiorix and Catuvolcus thought their mission was until they received messages from 
Indutiomarus. Their attack, therefore, surprises the Romans all the more because it was not 
premeditated. Caesar-narrator is explicit about this point, emphasizing the sudden nature of the 
Gallic attacks with adverbs and adjectives that show how quickly the Gauls decided to attack and 
how quickly they carried out their attack (e.g., subitoque and repentini). Sabinus is cleansed of 
culpability for allowing the initial Gallic attack; the Romans suffer from fides Gallica and not 
inept leadership. The Romans’ difficulty in potentially repelling an attack is compounded by the 
fact that some of the troops suffered the attack while gathering firewood. Because Caesar-
character had divided his forces to alleviate the potential ramifications of food scarcity, the wood 
gatherers may have represented a significant percentage of Sabinus’ fighting forces, thereby 
leaving the camp more vulnerable than normal. The attack occurs as a surprise and while the 
Romans, particularly the wood gatherers, are exposed. Though the attack was not planned in 
advance, there was still enough time for the Gauls to coordinate their attack with a time of 
weakness for the Romans, namely when they were out gathering firewood. Yet, despite these 
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difficulties, the Romans are able to rely on their camp in order to initiate a successful 
counterattack. Gathering their weapons, the Romans take to the ramparts (Cum celeriter nostri 
arma cepissent vallumque ascendissent) and then send out the Spanish cavalry units to rout the 
enemy. Without the fortifications of the camp—without the rampart—the Romans would have 
remained ill prepared to fight in the field. Instead, because they do take the rampart, there is 
enough time for the cavalry to swing the battle in the Romans’ favor. It should be noted, of 
course, that this victory is small: the Gauls attacked with a force that was not sent to attack in the 
first place. This example alone does not constitute evidence of the camp’s serviceability in 
defending against an attack. That said, coming so soon after the narrator’s remarks that the 
legates assured Caesar-character that their camps were fortified, it does provide evidence that 
Caesar-narrator is invested in the notion that Sabinus’ camp was secure. It also does show that 
the camp could defend against a siege if it needed to.  
Caesar-narrator also confirms that the campsite has suitable defense-works later in the 
BG. In 6.32 Caesar-character deems it a fit place for Cicero to maintain camp, even going so far 
as to order him to stay within the camp’s walls (6.36). He reminds the reader that this is the same 
camp. First, he calls attention to the site by name, “he [Caesar] took the baggage of all of the 
legions to Atuatuca. This is the name of the site” (impedimenta omnium legionum Atuatucam 
contulit. Id castelli nomen est.) (6.32.3). Second, he names both Sabinus and Cotta, “[the camp] 
where Titurius [Sabinus] and Aurunculeius [Cotta] had settled for the sake of wintering” (ubi 
Titurius atque Aurunculeius hiemandi causa consederant) (6.32.4). The camp had the ability to 
defend against an attack or a siege.  
 This point is later reaffirmed by Cotta. During the debate over whether or not the Romans 
ought to leave camp, Cotta—arguing that leaving would not constitute prudent practice—states 
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that the camps could hold off a large force of Gauls, offering as proof the fact that the Romans 
had survived the first attack and won, inflicting numerous wounds upon the enemy: “they 
showed that a force of Germans, no matter how great, would be able to be held back by their 
fortified winter camps; that this was proof, namely that they sustained the first attack of the 
enemy bravely with many wounds inflicted on the other side” (quantasvis magnas etiam copias 
Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant; rem esse testimonio, quod primum 
hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus inlatis fortissime sustinuerint) (5.28.4). It is clear from 
what happens to both Sabinus and Cotta that, at the very least, Sabinus was wrong in arguing 
contrary to Cotta.58 Moreover, given the fact that Cicero is able to withstand a difficult siege and 
seek help from Caesar, it is likely that Cotta’s argument would have saved the lives of the 
Romans. 
Sabinus, however, heard Ambiorix’s offer of safe passage to Labienus’ camp and 
concluded that the Romans ought to leave camp. Arguing that the offer from Ambiorix was 
genuine and that a lethal grain shortage was assured, Sabinus vigorously debated with Cotta that 
the camp cannot be defended, contrary to what his actions in Book Three suggests that he should 
do. Sabinus claimed that “the opportunity for taking counsel was small” (brevem consulendi esse 
occasionem) (5.29.1) and that “safety alone was in a swift retreat” (unam esse in celeritate 
positam salutem) (5.29.6), citing not only the present danger of attack, but also the frightening 
prospect of a grain shortage (… si praesens periculum non, at certe longinqua obsidione fames 
esset timenda) (5.29.7). In ascribing this last argument to Sabinus, Caesar-narrator invokes fear. 
                                                
58 Although the two men disagree and engage in a discussion in order to determine what course of action to take, it is 
worth noting that Holmes 1911: 105 asserts that Sabinus was the senior officer and thus had superior authority, 
citing Mommsen 1894: 68 (History of Rome) as further evidence. While I think it is perhaps too aggressive to 
assume that there had to be a senior and junior officer—and the text certainly does not make a hierarchy explicit—it 
is altogether reasonable that one of the two would be superior to the other. It might be in Caesar-narrator’s best 
narratological interests to make the legates appear more equal in status than they actually were, however, should 
Sabinus have held a higher position. See also Holmes 1911: 726 for a further explanation of his reasoning.  
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This is further emphasized by Sabinus' use of hyperbaton. Both statements (brevem consulendi 
esse occasionem) and (unam esse in celeritate positam salutem) start and end with accusative 
subjects in indirect speech that are in apposition to each other. Moreover, Caesar-narrator has 
Sabinus start both statements with the adjectives, placing the nouns at the end of the clauses, 
making both statements periodic and thereby heightening their rhetorical emphasis. This 
emphasis underscores the desperation of Sabinus' plea and shows how large a role fear is playing 
in his current decision-making—fear being an emotion that played a central part in Sabinus’ 
strategic decision to stay in camp during the siege in Book Three. On that occasion, Sabinus 
offered the impression of fear to the enemy, while still staying in camp due to the camp’s tactical 
value (tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit) (3.17.6). Sabinus, enduring his second siege, 
allowed fear to drive his decisions, adversely affecting his ability to make sound decisions, even 
though fear of a grain shortage should not have been a strategic factor. In fact, the entire point of 
splitting up the army was precisely to combat the potential of a grain shortage (5.24); the tactic’s 
success at the other camps, including Cicero’s—which also withstood a siege—implies that 
Sabinus’ and Cotta’s camp would have likewise survived the potential of starvation.  
Sabinus, in other words, did not trust in his strategic position, as is reinforced by the 
subsequent narrative. Instead, Sabinus led his men out of a secure camp that likely had enough 
grain. After leaving, they were forced to defend themselves on uneven ground, putting them at a 
grave disadvantage (iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt) (5.32.2). The 
Gauls chose the site for the battle, setting up two ambushes and finding a place that was 
convenient (conlocatis insidiis bipertito in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum 
circiter duobus Romanorum adventum exspectabant) (5.32.1). In Book Three, Sabinus was able 
to defend himself in a location suitable for withstanding an attack (idoneo … loco) (3.17.5); yet, 
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in Book Five, Sabinus gives that advantage way, allowing Ambiorix to capitalize on this tactical 
blunder (opportuno atque occulto loco) (5.32.1). Similar to the evaluative adjective idoneus from 
Book Three, opportuno also provides an instance of Caesar-narrator providing an implicit 
judgment of the action. It is particularly effective as a contrast with iniquissimo, the word that 
modifies the location upon which the Romans were forced to fight. The irony here sharply 
reminds the reader that Sabinus has truly committed a tactical blunder. Caesar-narrator 
emphasizes the severity of this blunder by placing the evaluative iniquissimo in the superlative. 
If the inclusion of an evaluative adjective constitutes a break from degree zero writing, then 
calling attention to its superlative state takes another metaphorical step away from a degree zero 
style. Caesar-narrator makes it clear for his reader: Sabinus has made a poor decision that has put 
his entire force into danger. They are in a most disadvantageous position for defending 
themselves.  Had Sabinus remained in the camp with his army, he would have been in a much 
better position to defend against Gallic attacks.  
In contrast to Sabinus, Cotta understood the importance of maintaining position in camp: 
“[Cotta said that] they were not pressed by the grain situation” (re frumentaria non premi) 
(5.28.5). Given the fact that Cotta offered solutions contrary to those that led to the men’s deaths, 
and given the fact that Cotta’s suggestions seem similar to the actions Sabinus took in Book 
Three, it is likely that his opinions hold a greater degree of validity. In fact, this entire debate 
seems to function as a synkrisis of Cotta and Sabinus.59 Synkrisis is a rhetorical juxtaposition of 
two elements, frequently structured as a comparison in which the author praises one side of the 
synkrisis and blames the other (though it can be used to praise or blame both sides of the 
                                                
59 Batstone 1988: 3, who examines the role of synkrisis in Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae, thus placing the rhetorical 
figure in a Roman literary context, argues that it maintains its traditional capacity to assign praise or blame in 
Sallust’s work. I would argue that it fulfills a similar function in this episode. For an example in the ancient 
literature of the act of comparison as a way to praise, see Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.9.38, in which Aristotle uses the 
infinitive συγκρίνειν when providing his reader with ways of bestowing praise.  
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comparison). As such, I would argue that Caesar-narrator, in setting up this synkrisis, continues 
to assert his narrative voice in order to lead the reader into thinking that Cotta is right and 
Sabinus is wrong.60 Cotta, in the synkrisis, represents the voice of reason and military propriety, 
inserted into the text by Caesar-narrator in order to make clear the mistakes that Sabinus 
makes.61 After all, from a narratological standpoint, Cotta is unnecessary to the unfolding of the 
events—Caesar could have simply written about Sabinus' mistakes and how that doomed his 
men.62 Cotta’s opinions, therefore, receive the approval of the narrator through their place in the 
synkrisis, lending them credibility.63 In asserting that the Romans had no reason to fear a grain 
shortage during a siege, Cotta has the narrator’s backing. Sabinus, by arguing the opposite, does 
not.  
Cicero, in contrast to Sabinus, maintained his position in camp and sought assistance 
from Caesar. The narrative arc leads one to believe that by staying in his camp, Cicero saves the 
lives of his men. When the Gauls first arrived at his camp, Cicero faced a strikingly similar 
situation to that which Sabinus faced. After defeating Sabinus and Cotta, Ambiorix roused the 
Aduatuci and the Nervii to revolt. He then sent out messengers to the Ceutrones, Grudii, Levaci, 
                                                
60 The reader need not seek explicit judgment, either. By providing just the facts, the reader receives enough 
judgment from Caesar-narrator’s tone. He does not need to persuade, simply show. See Grillo 2011: 246 for his 
characterization of the BC’s narrator: “The narrator does not try to persuade; rather, facts and his judgments on them 
are recorded with the same matter-of-fact tone.”  
61 Goldsworthy 1998: 202 agrees, writing “the correct behaviour for a Roman general faced with impending disaster 
is highlighted in the Commentarii by the contrasts between Sabinus on the one hand, and Cotta and Quintus Cicero 
on the other.” 
62 Brown 2013: 42-44 utilizes a similar approach. In arguing for the Rhine bridging’s literary value in Book Four, 
Brown points out the central, narratological placement the bridging has, even pointing out certain narratological 
techniques that Caesar employs like ring composition. Brown aptly shows that Caesar concerns himself with 
shaping his narrative through the arrangement of the text’s episodes. Grillo 2011: 245 furthers this claim when he 
notes that “the omniscient narrator can … rearrange chronology.” See also Grillo 2012: 170-171 for another 
example of ring composition as well as 158-174 for a discussion of the narratological structure of the entire BC.  
Genette 1980: 33-85, in his chapter on order, could provide an effective hermeneutic for understanding Caesar’s 
narratological structure, though such a consideration is outside of the scope of this paper.   
63 See Adcock 1956: 56 for the assertion that Caesar praises his legates for their adherence to the “ratio belli.” 
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Pleumoxii, and the Geidumni. When he had won them over, he led an assault on Cicero’s camp, 
rushing to it with as much haste as possible: 
Itaque confestim dimissis nuntiis ad Ceutrones, Grudios, Levacos, Pleumoxios, 
Geidumnos, qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt, quam maximas possunt manus 
cogunt et de improviso ad Ciceronis hiberna advolant, nondum ad eum fama de 
Titurii morte perlata. Huic quoque accidit—quod fuit necesse—, ut nonnulli 
milites, qui lignationis munitionisque causa in silvas discessissent, repentino 
equitum adventu interciperentur. His circumventis magna manu Eburones, Nervii, 
Aduatuci atque horum omnium socii clientesque legionem oppugnare incipiunt. 
Nostri celeriter ad arma concurrunt, vallum conscendunt. (5.39.1-3.) 
 
Thus with messengers sent to the Ceutrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumoxii, and the 
Geidumni at once, all of whom were under the rule of the Nervii, they all drafted 
the largest forces possible and unexpectedly flew to Cicero’s winter quarters, 
arriving before the news of Sabinus’ death. Likewise it happened to Cicero—
since it was necessary [to send men out to collect wood]—, that some soldiers 
who had gone into the woods for the sake of collecting wood for the defenses, 
were suddenly surrounded by the arrival of the Gallic cavalry. With our men 
surrounded, the Eburones, Nervii, the Aduatuci, and all of their allies and clients, 
with a large band of men, began to attack the legion. Our men quickly ran to arms 
and ascended the rampart.  
 
There are notable similarities between the Gallic attack on Sabinus and the attack on Cicero, 
suggesting strong intratextual links.64 First, both occur quickly and as a surprise. Caesar-narrator 
makes this clear with verbal echoes. Sabinus faces an initium repentini tumultus (5.26.1); 
Cicero's men are surrounded by a repentino equitum adventu. Sabinus' men are oppressed by a 
magna manu (5.26.2); Cicero's men are too (his circumventis magna manu).  
Second, the conditions under which Cicero’s men are attacked are remarkably similar to 
those under which Sabinus is attacked: both men have soldiers out in the field collecting wood. 
Caesar-narrator introduces this attack with the clause Huic quoque accidit. I have translated the 
quoque as “likewise,” attempting to maintain the more subtle comparison that Caesar-narrator 
makes between Cicero’s circumstances and Sabinus’. Of course, the connection need not be 
overt; the comparison between the two circumstances is readily apparent simply due to the 
                                                
64 For the role of intratextuality in the BG, see Damon 1994: 184-185 and Grillo 2012: 5-10. 
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events that constitute the plot of these episodes. It is worth noting that Caesar-narrator makes the 
comparison clear at the level of language. The inclusion of quoque as a bridge between the two 
attacks also deviates from Caesar-narrator’s typically degree zero style. Caesar-narrator is also 
referring back thirteen chapters for the referent of this quoque, making it clear that Sabinus 
should already be in the reader’s mind. Moreover, Caesar-narrator includes the fact that in both 
attacks the Romans were initially caught off-guard because they were out collecting wood. It is 
rare for Caesar to mention mundane actions that the soldiers must have taken on a daily basis, 
like collecting wood. In fact, according to Meusel’s Lexicon Caesarianum, 5.39.2 is the only 
occurrence of the word lignatio in the entirety of Caesar’s corpus, just as 5.26.2 is the only 
occurrence of the word lignator.65 The ThLL heightens the connection between the two episodes. 
The word lignator is only used five times in Latin, with Caesar’s usage being the earliest.66 
Similarly, Caesar is the first author in Latin to use lignatio.67 The uniqueness of these words ties 
the two passages together even more strongly than just the fact that both attacks occurred in a 
similar manner.68 It is clear that Caesar-narrator is asking his reader to compare how Sabinus and 
Cicero handled the same situation by presenting these intratextual links. 
Third, Cicero’s men take the appropriate action, just as Sabinus’ men did, for repelling a 
sudden attack: they take up their arms and trust in the rampart as an effective method of 
defending themselves and turning back the enemy. Note the similarities between how Caesar-
narrator relates the actions that Sabinus’ men took and the actions Cicero’s men took—Sabinus: 
Cum celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque ascendissent and Cicero: Nostri celeriter ad arma 
                                                
65 The related word lignor, lignari, lignatus sum does occur twice in the BC—3.15.2 and 3.76.2. The BG, however, 
contains no other reference to collecting wood using these words.  
66 The word has a historiographical feel for the Romans: Livy uses the word three times. For the ThLL citation, see 
Steinmann: VII 2 1383.33-36. 
67 See Steinmann: VII 2 1383.18-32.  
68 It is, of course, likely that soldiers used these words frequently; their usage in camp must have been constant. If 
this is true, then the words might not be rare per se. But, in literary Latin, these words are nearly non-existent.  
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concurrunt, vallum conscendunt. There is nothing particularly unusual about the words Caesar 
writes to narrate this scene. In fact, the words celeriter, nostri, and arma show up with such 
frequency that it is tempting to take them as emblems of the Caesarian style. And they may well 
be. Yet, the sentences are so remarkably similar that one cannot help but be reminded of the first 
occurrence upon reading the second. The soldiers apparently know what to do in circumstances 
such as being attacked on the field: a Roman soldier ought to take up his arms quickly, man the 
ramparts, and initiate a counterattack, which may include sending out the Spanish cavalry, as 
Sabinus did. The Roman soldiers know to trust in a Roman camp in the face of enemies. And so 
too does Cicero, based upon his actions following the attack. After attempting to send a message 
to Caesar—which never got through—Cicero has his men start preparing the camp for more 
attacks: “that night, using lumber that they had gathered for the sake of augmenting the defenses, 
they erected fully 120 towers with incredible speed; those things that seemed to be lacking in the 
defenses, were fixed” (Noctu ex materia, quam munitionis causa comportaverant, turres 
admodum centum XX excitantur incredibili celeritate. Quae deesse operi videbantur, 
perficiuntur) (5.40.2). Rather than entertain notions of leaving the camp for fear that his men 
might be overrun or starved out, Cicero instead reaffirms his commitment to maintaining the 
camp. He instructs his men to build more fortifications so that they might most effectively resist 
the enemy. Thus, when the enemy attacked the next day, the Roman soldiers resisted “with the 
same strategy that they used the day before” (a nostris eadem ratione qua pridie resistitur) 
(5.40.4). Not only did this method prove to be effective the first couple of times, but it also 
became the primary way by which the Romans defended themselves: “this same thing [the attack 
of the Gauls and their repulsion by the defensive methods the Romans had been using] happened 
on each successive day” (Hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus) (5.40.5). The ability of the 
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Romans to ward off Gallic attacks during successive days validates Cicero’s decision to remain 
in camp. 
Just as Sabinus fails to follow the first criterion of success, remaining in a well-fortified 
camp during a siege, so too does he fail to establish a strategic relationship with the enemy, the 
second criterion of success. Above, I asserted that Sabinus allows fear to govern his actions—
fearing a grain shortage, he argues that the Romans ought to leave camp. In addition, Sabinus’ 
unhelpful relationship with fear serves as an obstacle in his attempts to create an effective and 
strategic relationship with the enemy. Whereas in Book Three Sabinus had never parleyed with 
the enemy, he does so in Book Five, allowing the enemy to set the context of his decision to stay 
or leave camp. During the parley, Ambiorix advises Sabinus on what he thinks the legate ought 
to do: 
monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. Magnam 
manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. Ipsorum 
esse consilium, velintne prius, quam finitimi sentient, eductos ex hibernis milites 
aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum 
circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab iis absit. Illud se polliceri et iure 
iurando confirmare, tutum se iter per suos fines daturum. (5.27.7-10.) 
 
[He] warns and begs Sabinus, on the grounds that they are friends, that he look 
out for his safety and the safety of his men. [Saying] that a large band of 
Germans, having been hired, had crossed the Rhine; that it would arrive in two 
days’ time. That it was for them to decide if they wished, before those nearby 
perceived it, to take their soldiers out of winter quarters and to lead them either to 
Cicero’s camp or to Labienus’ camp, of whom one was around 50 miles away, the 
other was a bit farther than that. That he promised and confirmed by oath this fact: 
that he would give them save passage through his lands.  
 
From the enemy’s lips to Sabinus’: Ambiorix essentially lays out the exact plan that Sabinus 
would soon offer as his own in the debate with Cotta. Sabinus should have recognized that this 
advice would end quite poorly, like Cotta did, but he instead relies on his supposed friendship 
with Ambiorix as the security he needed to make the decision to leave camp, not even 
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recognizing that this notion of friendship as the rationale for leaving was prompted by Ambiorix 
himself (pro hospitio).69 Sabinus ought to have recognized that following his enemy’s advice 
would not end well; he had manipulated his enemies in Book Three in a similar fashion by 
sending a loyal Gaul to spread false information around the enemy camp. In fact, Cotta ends his 
speech in the debate by asking the obvious rhetorical question: “What is more foolish and stupid 
than taking advice on such important matters from the suggestions of the enemy?” (quid esse 
levius aut turpius quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?) (5.28.6). But, in his 
desperation and fear, Sabinus deludes himself and his men into thinking that they have received 
sound advice from a friend rather than false advice from an enemy. Caesar-narrator makes this 
explicit when he describes the army leaving camp: “Thus, at dawn, they left camp, persuaded 
that their plan was given to them not by an enemy but by the most friendly man, Ambiorix” 
(Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab homine 
amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum) (5.31.6). Caesar-narrator provides his judgment: 
Ambiorix never had Sabinus’ best interests in mind; their friendship was never sincere, but 
simply a tool of manipulation; and, Sabinus’ decision to follow the enemy’s advice is folly. 
Sabinus fails to deceive the enemy, instead allowing the enemy to deceive him with false 
assurances of friendship and safety.70 
Sabinus continued to make the same mistakes during the battle when he asked Ambiorix 
to engage in another parley: 
His rebus permotus Quintus Titurius cum procul Ambiorigem suos cohortantem 
conspexisset, interpretem suum Gnaeum Pompeium ad eum mittit rogatum, ut sibi 
                                                
69 As Grillo 2012: 64 notes, “iusiurandum is often used with vocabulary that stresses the enactment of a solid bond, 
which the Gauls often break.” For a Roman to consider a Gaul a friend who will therefore keep his word is foolish. 
70 We should also note that Sabinus fails at maintaining his courage. Given the same opportunity to use false fear in 
order to manipulate the enemy as he had in Book Three, Sabinus instead gives in to fear, affecting his decision 
making. See also the beginning of the battle (5.33), in which Sabinus’ fear causes confusion and hurts his soldiers’ 
capacity for fighting. They are only saved by Cotta’s foresight and lack of fear. 
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militibusque parcat. Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; 
sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi 
vero nihil nocitum iri inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta 
saucio communicat, si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una 
colloquantur; sperare se ab eo de sua ac militum salute impetrari posse. Cotta se 
ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo perseverat. (5.36.1-3.) 
 
Shaken up by these things, Sabinus, when he had perceived Ambiorix 
encouraging his men far off, sent his translator, Gnaeus Pompey, to him to ask 
that he [Ambiorix] spare him [Sabinus] and his soldiers. Having been addressed, 
he [Ambiorix] replied: if he wished to talk with him, then it is permitted; that he 
hoped that it would be possible to obtain from the multitude what pertained to the 
safety of the soldiers; that truly no injury would happen to him and for this thing 
he gave his word. He [Sabinus] communicates with the wounded Cotta whether it 
seemed right to cease from the fighting and hold a discussion together with 
Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped that he would be able to obtain from him [what 
was necessary] concerning his safety and the safety of the soldiers. Cotta says that 
he will not go to an armed enemy and perseveres in that opinion.  
 
Sabinus, still characterized by his fear (his rebus permotus), allows himself to be deceived by the 
enemy, even though Ambiorix is using the same trick twice. By assuring Sabinus that he will 
seek to ensure the safety of the Romans, Ambiorix makes the gamble that Sabinus is simply 
susceptible to that argument—the same argument he made back in 5.27.10. As it turns out, 
Sabinus is susceptible, thinking that it would be the only way he could save his men. Yet, 
Caesar-narrator implies that he is wrong by relaying how the Roman soldiers thought they might 
save themselves: “although they were abandoned by their leader and fortune, nonetheless our 
men were placing their entire hope for safety in courage” (nostri, tametsi ab duce et a fortuna 
deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant) (5.34.2). Whereas Sabinus locates 
hope for surviving this incident in the power of the enemy, the Roman soldiers recognize that the 
best chance for survival resides in their ability to fight back. Instead of acting with suspicion, 
however, Sabinus trusts the enemy, even doing what the enemy permits (licere). Sabinus allows 
Ambiorix to set the conditions of their meeting. Not only does he do what the enemy permits, but 
Sabinus also actively obeys an order from the enemy: “having been ordered to throw down his 
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weapons, he [Sabinus] follows the command and orders his men to do the same” (iussus arma 
abicere imperatum facit suisque ut idem faciant imperat) (5.37.1). Caesar-narrator employs 
heavy irony in this sentence: Sabinus, the supposed imperator of his men, obeys the imperatum 
of the enemy. As he throws down his weapons, he also throws down his authority.71 The result of 
this throwing down of arms is predictable—the Romans are surrounded and killed. It should 
have been obvious to Sabinus that his actions were quickly spiraling out of control and would 
soon get him killed, but his fear has distorted his decision making ability, whether it pertains to 
leaving the camp or meeting with the enemy on terms that are not strategically viable.  
Just like we saw earlier, Cotta provides a viable alternative to Sabinus in the synkrisis that 
the narrator establishes to praise Cotta and blame Sabinus. Knowing the foolishness of allowing 
the enemy to set the conditions for a parley, Cotta refuses to meet with Ambiorix, stating his 
opposition to the notion as a sort of gnomic statement: “Cotta denies that he will go to an armed 
enemy and perseveres in that opinion.” (Cotta se ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo 
perseverat). Cotta thus acts within the military guidelines that the narrator approves, seemingly 
stating his decision not to meet with armed enemies as if it were a rule. Cicero's actions later in 
Book Five show that this is, at least, a generally accepted principle for the Romans, if not a rule. 
Sabinus clearly did not follow the proper method of creating a relationship with the enemy—a 
fact that is all the more damning for Sabinus since he had acted correctly before and Cotta was 
reminding him continually that his relationship to the enemy was not strategically beneficial for 
the Romans.  
Cicero, conversely, established a much less dangerous relationship with the Gauls, 
primarily by ignoring the Gauls’ lies during their parley with the Romans. As I discussed earlier 
                                                
71 See Collins 1952: 94, who provides a similar reading, noting that “this sentence must have struck Roman readers 
with a peculiar bitterness.”  
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when evaluating Cicero’s decision to stay in camp, his immediate response to the initial Gallic 
attack was to send word—unsuccessfully—to Caesar and to shore up his defenses. While this did 
not allow him to establish as effective a response as Sabinus had in Book Three—surely it is 
more effective for one to deceive the enemy into attacking on terms that are beneficial for 
oneself—it did keep his army safe since they did not give into the deceptions of the Gauls. After 
the Gauls were daily frustrated in their attempts to take the camp, they sent their leaders to offer 
parley: 
Tunc duces principesque Nerviorum qui aliquem sermonis aditum causamque 
amicitiae cum Cicerone habebant colloqui sese velle dicunt. Facta potestate 
eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant … Cicero ad haec unum 
modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste 
armato condicionem; si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque 
ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos. Ab 
hac spe repulsi Nervii … (5.41.1, 7-8 and 5.42.1.) 
 
Then the leaders and princes of the Nervii who had any chance of talking with 
Cicero or any claim to friendship said that they wished to parley with him. With 
the opportunity given, they mentioned the same arguments that Ambiorix had 
made with Sabinus … Cicero gave only one response to this: [saying] that it is not 
the custom of the Roman people to accept terms from an armed enemy; if they 
wished to lay down their arms, they might use him as an aid in sending diplomats 
to Caesar; that he was hoping that, on account of his [Caesar’s] fairness, they 
would obtain what they were seeking. Repulsed from their hope [of entrapping 
the Romans] the Nervii …  
 
From the beginning of this quotation, the parallels between this episode and the Sabinus episode 
are stark. The Nervii, like Ambiorix, try to set the context of their conversation as that between 
friends (causam … amicitiae). But, Cicero does not allow this context to stick, recognizing that 
he is in fact talking to the enemy (hoste). The narrator continues making the similarities explicit 
by acknowledging the fact that the Nervii attempted to persuade Cicero to leave his winter 
quarters by using the same arguments that Ambiorix had used with Sabinus (eadem quae 
Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant), showing that the Sabinus narrative is supposed to 
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be on the readers' minds throughout the narrative about Cicero. Again, Cicero refuses to budge 
from his position, neither allowing the enemy to influence him nor leaving camp due to fear.  
Instead, Cicero remains resolute, saying “that it is not the custom of the Roman people to 
accept terms from an armed enemy” (non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste 
armato condicionem). Restating the seemingly gnomic statement that Cotta had said earlier—
that Romans do not meet with an armed enemy—Cicero proves his strategically sound 
relationship with the enemy.72 The phrase armatus hostis, which occurred in Cotta’s statement as 
well, is a rare phrase for the Caesarian corpus. Meusel, under Armatus as a participle modifying 
a word, lists only three circumstances of the phrase armatus hostis, with the third occurring at 
2.27.2 (calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent). Its use there is 
to contrast unarmed calones with the armed enemies, as is emphasized by the juxtaposition of 
inermes armatis. Yet, it is worth noting the distance between hostes and armatis, perhaps 
suggesting that the phrase is odd for Caesar. Given the fact that the phrase armatus hostis does 
not occur with frequency in Caesar’s work, it is safe to assume that the repetition here functions 
as a way for the narrator to bring the two men together. The synkrisis between Cotta and Sabinus 
routinely praised Cotta; thus, by having Cicero parrot Cotta, he likewise receives a great degree 
of praise for how he handled the enemy.  
Sabinus failed to follow the first two criteria of defending against a siege that Caesar-
narrator writes he had followed in Book Three—he did not trust in his secure fortifications and 
he did not establish a strategically effective relationship with the enemy; as a result, he does not 
follow the correct military protocol that aligns him with the approval of Caesar-narrator. That is 
to say, he does not follow the chain of command as exemplified by his adherence to Caesar’s 
                                                
72 What I call a gnomic statement, Riggsby 2006: 94 calls “the conventional Roman reply” to the offer of 
negotiation while the enemy is under arms.  
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narrative voice. Earlier, I argued that as a direct result of compelling his army to leave camp, 
Sabinus gave the Gauls the opportunity to choose their preferred location for committing to 
battle. Caesar reports this fact with the following language: “they [the Gauls] began to engage in 
battle on very uneven ground for us” (iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt) 
(5.32.2). I briefly compared the word choice here with the similarly phrased idoneo … loco from 
3.17.5. If, as I demonstrated in Part Two of this thesis, Caesar-narrator uses an evaluative 
adjective such as idoneus to appeal to a shared body of knowledge and thus employs the word in 
a manner that demonstrates his approval, then a similar logic should apply here to iniquus. In this 
instance, however, the narrator employs the word to demonstrate his disapproval with the 
situation into which Sabinus has led his army. I have argued above that Caesar-narrator’s 
deployment of the superlative indicates the degree and severity of his displeasure. Unlike before 
in Book 3, when Sabinus’ actions brought him into accord with standard military tactics—tactics 
that Caesar-narrator, in presenting them as tactics of which he approves, appropriates as his own 
tactics and guidelines for the officers to follow—Caesar-narrator introduces a disruption in the 
narrator / officer relationship.73 Sabinus no longer acts in conjunction with approved tactics, and 
thus he acts without the narrator’s approval. His actions have more than literary implications, 
however; for Sabinus and his men, it is deadly not to act in accordance with widely accepted 
military convention. Quite literally, it is deadly to act in a way contrary to how Caesar-narrator 
would wish one to act. Sabinus, in leaving camp and engaging with the enemy in a way that is to 
the Romans’ disadvantage, has his relationship with the narrator disrupted, and by taking the sort 
of action that the narrator disapproves, his men die.  
                                                
73 In characterizing Sabinus, Caesar-narrator shapes himself. Thus this passage fulfills a literary function in addition 
to a political one, as Collins 1952: 90 implies when he writes that reading this episode shows “how Caesar has 
selected and grouped the facts to show us Sabinus in the worst possible light.” Of course, the two aspects might 
function together—and, in fact, I think they do. I also think, however, that it is fruitful to examine how Caesar writes 
towards a political goal artistically. Selecting words is as important as selecting and presenting facts.  
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Caesar-narrator further highlights Sabinus’ lack of engagement with correct military 
action by contrasting him with his co-legate, Cotta: 
Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum 
centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris 
discedendum existimabant; quantasvis magnas etiam copias Germanorum 
sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant; rem esse testimonio, quod primum 
hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus inlatis fortissime sustinuerint; re 
frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura 
subsidia; postremo quid esse levius aut turpius quam auctore hoste de summis 
rebus capere consilium? (5.28.3-6.) 
 
Cotta, and most of the tribunes of the soldiers and centurions of the first rank, 
thought that nothing ought to be done rashly and that they should not depart from 
winter quarters without Caesar’s order; they showed that a force of Germans, no 
matter how great, would be able to be held back by their fortified winter camps; 
that this was proof, namely that they sustained the first attack of the enemy 
bravely with many wounds inflicted on the other side; that they were not pressed 
by the grain situation; meanwhile, that help would come from neighboring winter 
camps and from Caesar; finally, what is more stupid and foolish than to adopt a 
plan concerning the most important things on the authority of the enemy?  
 
As I argued above, the narrator frequently compares both legates in a sort of synkrisis, through 
which he leads the reader to conclude that Cotta is right in his opinions about how the army 
ought to respond to a siege and that Sabinus is wrong in his opinions. Narrative approval of 
Cotta’s actions can function as an implied and negative demonstration of the narrator’s 
disapproval of Sabinus’ actions. This disapproval vis-à-vis approval stands out most prominently 
when Cotta directly contradicts Sabinus’ wrong opinions. Cotta is not the only person of note 
who disagrees with Sabinus’ opinions, however. The tricolon that starts the quotation indicates 
near unification among the upper-level personnel in opposition to Sabinus’ opinions; most of the 
military tribunes and leading centurions take Cotta’s side. In fact, the only person omitted from 
this group of high ranking Roman soldiers is Sabinus himself. In contrast, Sabinus’ support 
comes from the lower ranking soldiers, and the support is achieved through fear mongering that 
whips up the common soldier (5.30). In contrast, the quotation above is a list of rational opinions 
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that contradict Sabinus’: the Romans ought not to leave camp rashly (temere), especially 
considering the fact that they had just proved that their camp could withstand a Gallic attack; 
they were not in danger of a grain shortage; and it would be stupid and foolish to act on the 
advice of enemies (levius aut turpius).74 Cotta’s first two points have logical support. The 
decision to say in camp would be correct based upon principle (the Romans should stay in camp, 
as is correct to do), experience (Caesar-character sent them to the camp in the first place), and 
empirical proof (the camp just withstood an attack). The lack of concern about the grain shortage 
rests upon Caesar-character’s preparations: the entire point of splitting the army up was to 
alleviate the grain problem, as I mentioned above. Cotta’s last point has its roots in another major 
priority: it is foolish to act in harmony with the enemy’s approval when it is much better to take 
action that would be approved by one’s commanding officer (or the narrator). The narrator, by 
presenting Cotta’s question in oratio obliqua rather than as an indirect question makes it clear 
that the question is strictly rhetorical and that therefore the reason is obvious: “nothing is more 
stupid and foolish than to adopt a plan approved by enemies.” Cotta thus asserts an agreed upon 
notion of how one ought to act as a commander: bring your actions into line with appropriate 
military precepts, not the enemy’s suggestion. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, Cotta (and the other leading soldiers) aligns his 
actions with what Caesar would potentially want, acknowledging that short of understanding 
Caesar’s wishes, prudence is the correct approach in formulating military decisions. During his 
list of opinions that run contrary to Sabinus’ proposed course of action, Cotta argues that “help 
would come from neighboring winter camps and from Caesar” (ex proximis hibernis et a 
Caesare conventura subsidia). If we define the chain of command as acting with deference to 
                                                
74 For more on the troubles of acting rashly (temere), see Grillo 2012: 33 who reads Curio’s swiftness in the second 
book of the BC as “unreasonable.” 
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Caesar (either Caesar-character or Caesar-narrator, depending upon how the narrator wishes to 
shape the episode), then Cotta advocates the correct course of action. By waiting for Caesar-
character in a fortified camp, the Roman army would maximize its potential to be saved—this 
potential for rescue seems confirmed by the narrator, moreover, when he tells of Caesar’s rescue 
of Cicero. Whereas Cotta recognizes the potential for Caesar-character to rescue his men, 
Sabinus betrays his lack of an effective relationship with Caesar-character when he misjudges 
where Caesar even is: “he thought that Caesar had gone to Italy” (Caesarem arbitrari profectum 
in Italiam) (5.29.2), especially considering the fact that the narrator has earlier made clear 
Caesar-character’s intentions: “Meanwhile, he [Caesar], until he understood that the legions were 
collected and the winter quarters were fortified, decided to remain in Gaul” (Ipse interea, quoad 
legiones collocatas munitaque hiberna cognovisset, in Gallia morari constituit) (5.24.8). When 
Caesar-character comes to the rescue of Cicero, after receiving Cicero’s letter, he orders Crassus 
to join him (5.46). As Hammond 1996: 233 astutely mentions, Caesar was at Samarobriva at the 
time, a stronghold of the Ambiani, which is modern day Amiens and is in northern France. 
Caesar-character was far from Italy.  
In initiating his list of opinions, Cotta, alongside his fellow leading soldiers, advocates 
that the Romans ought not to do anything rashly, without the command of Caesar (Lucius 
Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere 
agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant). In Book Three, Caesar-
narrator provides an explanation for Sabinus’ decision to stay in camp, feign fear, and send a 
Gallic messenger to deceiver the enemy thusly:  
Id ea de causa faciebat, quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo 
absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut opportunitate aliqua 
data legato dimicandum non existimabat. (3.17.7.) 
 
 54 
He [Sabinus] was acting this way for this reason, namely that he did not think that 
a subordinate officer ought to engage with so great a multitude of enemies 
especially with the man who holds supreme military command absent, unless he 
could engage on equal ground or some other opportunity came about.  
 
Earlier, I showed that Sabinus’ reluctance to act without his commanding officer present aligned 
him with the approval of Caesar-narrator, paying particular attention to the ablative absolute eo 
absente. Cotta, in arguing for prudence, employs a similar logic to that of Sabinus in Book 
Three, even echoing his phrase dimicandum non existimabat with discedendum existimabant, 
with the latter recalling the former both semantically and phonically. Just as Sabinus in Book 
Three did not wish to act without his commanding officer providing instructions, so too does 
Cotta shy away from making rash decisions without an order from Caesar (neque ex hibernis 
iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant); in addition, just as Sabinus’ mode of thinking in 
the earlier episode brought himself into alignment with the narrative voice, so too does Cotta’s. 
In this way, Cotta, in contrast to Sabinus in the later episode, acts in accordance with established 
military precepts (which is reinforced by the fact that most of the other leading soldiers agree 
with Cotta), throwing Sabinus’ failure to do so in Book Five into even sharper relief than the 
disapproval of the narrator’s voice. 
Cicero, like Cotta and unlike Sabinus, does take the proper action as determined by the 
narrator, thus following established military convention.75 Indeed, he even follows a strikingly 
similar course of action to that which Cotta was advocating chapters earlier. As I mentioned 
above, after Cicero was first attacked, he immediately sent word—unsuccessfully—to Caesar 
and fortified his camp (5.40.1-4). Like Cotta, Cicero recognizes the value of acting in accord 
with Caesar’s wishes; the successful legate acts prudently by shoring up his defenses while 
awaiting word from his commander. In fact, as is clear once Cicero and Caesar are able to 
                                                
75 See Riggsby 2006: 95, who writes “The different result under these circumstances [from the result under Sabinus 
and Cotta] was due precisely to Cicero’s (and his soldiers’) strategic restraint based on obedience to authority.”  
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communicate, Cicero had placed all of his hope of survival in the camp (5.40), his men’s ability 
to defend the camp (5.42-44), and Caesar’s assistance (5.45). As the situation worsens, we 
actually learn that more and more messages and dispatches were sent off to Caesar from Cicero’s 
camp, thus indicating the sincerity with which Cicero wished to reach Caesar (5.45.1). As 
Riggsby notes, difficulties of communication are “mentioned only in this episode,” though he 
astutely notes that they may have been “common throughout the course of the war.”76 Like in 
Caesar-narrator’s use of lignatio, a rare word in Caesar’s texts (and Latin literature in general) 
but more than likely common among the everyday parlance of soldiers, the unique highlighting 
of what must have been a common occurrence underscores how central Cicero’s attempt to 
communicate with Caesar-character is. It is the type of detail Caesar-narrator does not typically 
include, thus making its inclusion all the more important.   This sort of extraneous detail 
indicates the approval that Cicero finds in Caesar’s narrative voice. As I demonstrated above, it 
is typical for the narrator to break his “degree zero style” of narration when the addition of a 
detail will influence how the reader responds to a character in the text. Here is another instance 
of Caesar’s narrative voice extrapolating from Cicero’s situation an inferred attitude toward 
reaching Caesar by dispatch, namely that Cicero felt it necessary to perform continual outreach 
to his commander. There is no reason for Caesar-narrator to include this detail, except to imply 
that Cicero’s desire to reach Caesar is a necessary component for understanding the narrator’s 
characterization of the legate. Perhaps we might consider the fact that it increases the desperate 
tone of the narrative, creating a more intense circumstance from which Caesar might rescue 
Cicero. Yet, this intensification of the narrative would likewise enhance Cicero’s standing in 
Caesar-character’s eyes (as well as Caesar-narrator’s).  
                                                
76 Riggsby 2006: 95. 
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As evidence of this enhancement, I turn to how Caesar-character depicts his perception of 
Cicero’s actions during and after he saves Cicero and his men. After Cicero and Caesar had been 
able to achieve at least rudimentary communication through messengers, Caesar writes to 
Cicero: “In the letter he [Caesar] wrote that he would soon arrive with his legions; [and] he urged 
[Cicero] that he maintain his former courage” (In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum 
celeriter adfore; hortatur, ut pristinam virtutem retineat) (5.48.6). In using the adjective 
pristinus, Caesar-character retroactively approves of Cicero’s actions, arguing that Cicero’s 
decision to maintain his position in camp, disregard the deceptions of the enemy, and reach out 
to his commander (which is to say, act in accordance with established military convention) are 
all acts of virtus. Cicero thus receives a strong endorsement from Caesar-character for his 
actions. But, again, Caesar-narrator’s decision to include this extraneous information means that 
he is appropriating Caesar-character’s endorsement as his own. By having Caesar-character 
approve of Cicero’s actions, Caesar-narrator approves of his actions too, acknowledging that 
Cicero, throughout the siege, had acted in accordance with his (the narrator’s) approval. After 
Caesar-character rescues Cicero, he expresses a similar sentiment: “He [Caesar] praised Cicero, 
according to his merits, and the legion” (Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque conlaudat) 
(5.52.4). Cicero, here in first position and thus emphatically placed, receives the type of praise 
that can be seen as praise stemming simultaneously from Caesar-character and Caesar-narrator. 
The connection of praise between Caesar-character and –narrator is also evident in the ambiguity 
of the phrase pro eius merito: it could be translated as either “Caesar praised Cicero, as Caesar 
[the character] thought Cicero deserved” or as “Caesar praised Cicero, as I [as narrator] feel he 
deserved.”  
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Cicero, like Sabinus in Book Three and Cotta in Book Five, acts in conjunction with the 
approval of the narrator; his deeds are those that a legate should undertake in the same 
circumstance, as dictated by the narrator, who thus presents himself as an arbiter of proper 
military action. By presenting unequivocal cases of success that were successful precisely 
because of the actions that the narrator endorses, the narrator in turn presents himself as a 
reliable source for what can be considered proper military action. Caesar-narrator takes upon 
himself the mantle of arbiter of military thought, deploying his narrative and his characters as 
examples of his military high-mindedness. Cotta’s and Sabinus’ deaths function similarly as 
well. Sabinus’ death appears to be the negative example that departs from his earlier actions as 
well as those of Cicero’s in Book Five. The narrator implies that by ignoring the typical military 
action sanctioned by the narrator one ensures one’s failure just as readily as one ensures one’s 
success by ascribing to the narrator’s view of proper conduct. Sabinus’ death was a certainty 
because he broke from military propriety, the rectitude of which the narrator assumes for himself 
and his own narrative voice.  
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Chapter Five: Caesar-character and Caesar-narrator 
Sabinus successfully wards off a Gallic siege in Book Three by employing three tactics in 
particular: he maintains his position in a tactically advantageous camp, he establishes a 
strategically effective relationship with the enemy through deception, and he follows the chain of 
command as typified by adherence to military protocol that Caesar-narrator approves. In Book 
Five, however, Sabinus does not follow the same criteria for success in defending against a siege 
that he used in Book Three; instead, he argues with his co-legate Cotta that they take actions 
contrary to what worked in Book Three. Even though Cotta disagreed with him, the Romans still 
follow Sabinus’ advice and, as a result, they are nearly all killed. In contrast, later in Book Five 
Quintus Cicero, when facing a Gallic siege similar to the one that had killed Sabinus’ men, elects 
to follow the same criteria of success that Sabinus established in Book Three, saving his men in 
the process. Of particular significance is his decision to send for his commander. Caesar, after 
receiving Cicero’s letter, hastens to his legate’s winter quarters, draws the enemy away from the 
camp, and beats them in battle. Cicero’s actions are validated by both Caesar-narrator and 
Caesar-character’s rescue operation; unlike Sabinus’ men, Cicero’s men survive a trying 
situation, and Caesar-character plays a major part in their survival. 
Caesar-character’s introduction into the narrative introduces a new element for 
investigation. Thus far, my approach in evaluating how the officers in the BG function has been 
both narratological (Genette) and semiological (Barthes), though the two approaches are strongly 
tied. I have added to this approach a philological reading of the text. Using Genette’s three 
definitions of “narrative” as the theoretical support for my narratological approach and Barthes’ 
concept of “writing degree zero” for my linguistic approach, I have demonstrated that Caesar-
narrator frequently, and in a manner that is hidden in plain sight, asserts his voice in such a way 
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that he can relay his approval or disapproval of an officer’s actions to the reader. When Caesar-
narrator approves of an officer’s actions, and when the officer acts in accordance with what 
seems like an established military protocol that the narrator favors, the two entities seem to meld 
together, at least in respect to how they approach the same situations. The officer’s reputation is 
enhanced, his actions approbated, and the narrator’s opinions about how officers ought to act are 
shown to be accurate. In this way, Caesar-narrator casts himself as an arbiter of military thought 
and proper strategic conduct. By characterizing as correct the officer who works within a 
framework of proper military action established by the narrator, Caesar-narrator shifts the 
consideration of what constitutes correct military action from the officer, who carries out the 
action, to the narrator, who prescribes the action as correct. After the narrator has completed his 
telling of the two episodes (Sabinus and Cicero), the impulse to evaluate Caesar under similar 
standards arises.77 Thus, I would like to argue in this conclusion that the melding of the legates 
with the narrator asks the reader of the BG to consider Caesar-character’s relationship with 
Caesar-narrator. I will further argue that Caesar-narrator casts Caesar-character as following 
similar criteria to that which Sabinus did in Book Three. Ultimately, Caesar-character is elided 
with—as much as such a thing is possible—with Caesar-narrator.78 This melding or elision helps 
us discern how Caesar-author might have hoped his narrator and character would have been 
perceived by his reading audience.  
Caesar-character, like Sabinus in Book Three and Cicero in Book Five, respects the 
necessity of maintaining a fortified camp while defending against a siege, particularly when it 
affords the Roman commander an opportunity to control the surrounding terrain in a strategically 
                                                
77 See Goldsworthy 1998: 195-212 for an examination of Caesar the general (whom I would call Caesar-character). 
Goldsworthy argues that Caesar is typically bold and active, but to a greater degree than his peers. He may act like a 
general in a typical fashion, but he does so exceptionally.  
78 As Grillo 2012: 138 notes, such occurrences do occur in the BC as well—“Caesar the narrator and Caesar the 
character cooperate in achieving the same goal.”  
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efficient way. Upon learning that Cicero was besieged, Caesar musters reserve forces and 
deploys other forces, calmly preparing his army for battle and ascertaining that other winter 
quarters could be sufficiently defended. In the course of this restructuring, Caesar writes to 
another officer in charge of a winter camp, Labienus, telling him to join up with the main forces, 
if it is possible: “he [Caesar-character] wrote to Labienus, saying that if it is possible to do so 
without any harm to the common good, he should come into the territory of the Nervii with his 
legion” (scribit Labieno, si reip. commodo facere possit, cum legione ad fines Nerviorum veniat) 
(5.46.4). Caesar sends his request to Labienus with the understanding that the situation on the 
ground might not afford Labienus the opportunity to comply with the request. This caveat 
emphasizes the degree of trust that Caesar-character had in his legates to make decisions that 
were pertinent to their specific situations, similar to what Sabinus had done in Book Three and 
what Cicero was currently doing. Caesar-character trusts that his subordinate officers will follow 
established protocol by complying with accepted military standards that govern action. 
Labienus’ response underscores the importance of keeping his position in a fortified 
camp:  
Labienus interitu Sabini et caede cohortium cognita, cum omnes ad eum 
Treverorum copiae venissent, veritus ne, si ex hibernis fugae similem 
profectionem fecisset, hostium impetum sustinere non posset, praesertim quos 
recenti victoria efferri sciret, litteras Caesari remittit, quanto cum periculo 
legionem ex hibernis educturus esset, rem gestam in Eburonibus perscribit, docet 
omnes equitatus peditatusque copias Treverorum tria milia passuum longe ab suis 
castris consedisse.  
Caesar consilio eius probato, etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas 
redierat, tamen unum communis salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat. (5.47.4-
48.1.) 
 
Labienus, when he learned about the death of Sabinus and massacre of his 
cohorts, and since the forces of the Treveri had all come to him, feared that if he 
left his winter quarters in a manner similar to flight he would not be able to 
survive the attack of the enemy, especially since he knew that the enemy was 
ecstatic over their recent victory. He [Labienus] sent a letter back to Caesar 
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expressing how dangerous it would be to lead the legion out of the winter 
quarters. He told him about everything that happened among the Eburones and 
showed that the whole army of the Treveri—the cavalry and the infantry—had 
encamped three miles away from his camp. 
Caesar, approving of his [Labienus’] judgment, although he had hoped to have 
three legions and now had been reduced to two, nevertheless placed the only hope 
of helping out the common good in speed.  
 
This passage contains three key elements. First is Labienus’ initial response to Caesar’s request: 
he is concerned that leaving his camp would appear like he was fleeing and that this departure 
would put him in a disadvantageous position for defending himself. By leaving the camp in a 
manner that looks like flight, Labienus would encourage the enemy to attack his troops when 
they have insufficient defenses. Labienus intuits the dangers of leaving a fortified camp and 
instead follows military protocol, even though that means denying Caesar his request. Second is 
Labienus’ letter to Caesar: he informs Caesar of the danger that he is in and of what is occurring 
in the region in which he is encamped. Third, and most important for this thesis, is Caesar-
character’s response, mainly given in the ablative absolute consilio eius probato. When chapter 
48 starts, the word Caesar emphatically denotes the shift in focalization from Labienus to 
Caesar-character, thus emphasizing the actions of Caesar-character. The phrasing of the 
sentence's beginning shows Caesar’s approval of Labienus’ actions, especially considering the 
fact that consilio eius probato may be more logically written as consilio Labieni probato or with 
a connecting relative. Thus it becomes evident that Caesar respects Labienus’ decision to 
maintain his own camp. Caesar appreciates Labienus’ appeal to conventional military tactics and 
allows him to stay in his camp. 
Caesar-character himself also understands the value of securing a fortified Roman camp. 
After drawing the enemy away from Cicero’s camp, Caesar recognizes that speed is no longer 
necessary for the rescue operation and decides to settle into a camp: 
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Consedit et, quam aequissimo loco potest, castra communit atque haec, etsi erant 
exigua per se, vix hominum milium septem, praesertim nullis cum impedimentis, 
tamen angustiis viarum, quam maxime potest, contrahit, eo consilio, ut in 
summam contemptionem hostibus veniat. (5.49.7.) 
 
He [Caesar] stopped and fortified a camp in the most advantageous position 
possible and although the camp was small in and of itself—there was scarcely 
room for seven thousand men, even without the baggage—nevertheless he made it 
as small as possible through the narrowness of the roads so that, through this 
course of action, he might come into the enemy's contempt.  
 
Caesar-narrator continues his deployment of the superlative in describing locations of strategic 
benefit—a rhetorical tool that I highlighted above. In this instance, he writes that Caesar-
character secured his camp in the “the most advantageous position possible” (quam aequissimo 
loco potest), doubling down on emphatic phrasing by combining quam + the superlative with the 
intensification of the optional potest. This deployment of emphatically approving language has a 
similar effect as it did with Sabinus and Cicero when the actions of either man warranted 
approval. It demonstrates that Caesar-narrator approves of Caesar-character’s strategic decisions. 
His camp placement and makeup was essentially as perfect as possible, particularly since it 
caused the enemy to disregard it and not attempt to capture it. The deployment of approving 
language also depicts Caesar-character as acting in conjunction with proper military tactics—
tactics that are, yet again, approved by Caesar-narrator. In this way, the opinions of Caesar-
character and Caesar-narrator meld: both Caesarian entities come together on the value of a 
fortified camp and deception. To anticipate an argument I am going to make below, in the course 
of which argument I will more fully investigate this relationship, I would like to note that even 
when Caesar-character himself maintains a fortified camp, Caesar-narrator expresses the act in 
the same way that he did with Sabinus and Cicero.  
Not only does Caesar-character follow the first criterion of Sabinus’ model for success by 
securing a camp, but he also appropriately enacts the second by establishing an effective 
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relationship with the enemy precisely by manipulating the enemy through deception. When 
writing to Cicero, for example, Caesar-character writes in Greek so that the enemy cannot 
intercept and understand the message: “He [Caesar] sends this dispatch entirely in Greek, so that, 
if it were intercepted by the enemy, they would not be able to learn our plans” (hanc Graecis 
conscriptam litteris mittit, ne intercepta epistula nostra ab hostibus consilia cognoscantur) 
(5.48.4). Later, when Caesar-character has already fortified his own camp and has drawn the 
enemy away from Cicero’s, he utilizes a strategy that Sabinus employed in Book Three: he 
pretends to be afraid in order to lure the enemy into a positon most desirable for the Romans to 
attack (… si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset ...) (5.50.3). Caesar-
character, as the narrator makes explicit, pretends to be afraid by giving off the appearance of 
fear in addition to deceiving the enemy by artificially shrinking his camp.79 In doing so, he is 
able to entice the enemy to fight on his terms—note the use of suus here, making it clear that 
Caesar wanted to fight in a specific place that he already controlled.80 After the cavalry ran out to 
engage the enemy and then retreat, as if they were afraid, Caesar-character “orders that in doing 
these things [namely, shoring up the defenses of the camp] there be as much running around as 
possible and that things be done with the appearance of fear” (in his administrandis rebus quam 
maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet) (5.50.5). Caesar, doing what even 
Sabinus could not do in Book Three, convinces his men of the validity of this tactic, ordering 
them to also display the appearance of panic. In doing so, Caesar-character not only 
demonstrates his complete control over his men in contrast to Sabinus, but he also achieves his 
main goal of goading the enemy into battle on favorable terms for the Romans. Caesar-narrator 
                                                
79 It should be noted that the narrator never makes it explicit that Sabinus was acting timoris simulatione. The 
evidence suggests, however, that Sabinus was not actually afraid, but was instead performing fear. See my 
arguments above for more detail.  
80 It does also contrast with suo loco from 5.50.1, which there describes the Gauls' superior position.  
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writes, “Coaxed by all these things, the enemy led forth their troops and formed a battle line on 
unfavorable ground” (Quibus omnibus rebus hostes invitati copias traducunt aciemque iniquo 
loco constituunt) (5.51.1). As has become typical for circumstances in which Caesar-narrator 
discusses a Roman engaging in a certain location, the narrator here uses another evaluative 
adjective. The battle will be fought on unfavorable ground for the Gauls, precisely because of the 
deception that Caesar-character employs against them. 
Twice now in presenting evidence of Caesar-character’s similarity of action to Sabinus in 
Book Three and Cicero in Book Five I have cited as evidence certain words (typically evaluative 
adjectives in the superlative, such as aequissimo) that are typical of words that Caesar-narrator 
uses when aligning himself with either Sabinus or Cicero (or Cotta, for that matter). As I have 
suggested before with the officers, these words meld the officer with the narrator in such a way 
that they appear to be appealing to the same set of military guidelines. This, of course, is the 
product of the narrator creating this melding since the officer is acting in deference to established 
military convention and to Caesar-character’s wishes. The officer could not have known how 
Caesar-narrator would have framed the episodes themselves. Caesar-narrator, in contrast, does 
frame the narratives in order both to enhance the officer’s reputation for acting in the proper 
manner and to enhance his own reputation by establishing what is shown to be a successful tactic 
and what is not. In this way, Caesar-narrator casts himself as an arbiter of proper military 
conduct: he approves or disapproves of certain acts with his narratological structure and his 
specific word choices with the result that he sets the expectations for what a reader thinks an 
officer or commander ought to do in any given situation, such as defending against a siege or 
conducting a rescue operation. In both circumstances, Caesar-character and his successful 
officers have exercised similar techniques: they all respected the capacities of a Roman camp to 
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defend against an enemy and they have all established tactically effective relationships with the 
enemy that capitalize on either deceiving the enemy (Caesar-character in Book Five and Sabinus 
from Book Three) or resisting the enemy’s attempt to be deceptive (Cicero and Cotta in Book 
Five).  
The officers, however, also employed a third technique—something that I have been 
calling adherence to proper military conduct—that Caesar-character cannot as readily do. In 
acting in accordance with military propriety, the officers follow the chain of command, a basic 
military priority. An officer can literally follow the chain of command by obeying the commands 
of Caesar-character. He can also follow a sort of metaphorical chain of command that Caesar-
narrator establishes. Caesar-narrator, in showing the officers as following proper military 
conduct that he, in turn, approves, depicts the officers as being subordinate to him, as if his 
adjudication over what is proper is an act of a commanding officer. The narrator sets up a 
metaphorical chain of command by embodying whatever constitutes proper action. In this way, 
the officer who follows established military conduct follows a chain of command in which the 
narrator is the supreme commander. Thus, when the two meld—officer and narrator—it is to the 
benefit of the officer’s reputation because he, for a moment, has his opinion elevated to the status 
of a commander’s opinion.  
Caesar-character, however, cannot follow this third criterion of following the chain of 
command. Just as Caesar-narrator inhabits the top spot of the metaphorical chain of command, so 
too does Caesar-character occupy the top spot of the actual chain of command. In no way can 
Caesar, the lead general, obey the commands of a higher authority; in the BG, where Rome and 
the Senate are hardly present, there are no higher authorities. Thus, Caesar-character and Caesar-
narrator occupy equivalent positions by being on top of two respective chains of command, one 
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literal and the other metaphorical. They fulfill different literary functions, as is most easily 
evidenced by the fact that the narrator adopts a first-person voice and assigns the third-person to 
Caesar-character. Yet, they both attempt to collapse this difference, particularly Caesar-narrator. 
By depicting Caesar-character in a similar fashion to how he depicts Sabinus in Book Three and 
Cicero in Book Five, Caesar-narrator invites his reader to see an analogous melding of character 
and narrator. The narrator depicts the character’s action in order to suggest that there is not just a 
unity of thought between character and narrator, but of person as well (in as much as the narrator 
can be personified). Caesar-character, as the man who not only follows the precepts of correct 
military action but also determines these precepts for those under his command, fulfills the role 
that the narrator plays for his officers. Both men, by occupying the top of their respective chains 
of command, occupy the same space in relation to the officers: they determine how the officers 
ought to act, with Caesar-character presenting this determination to the officers directly and 
Caesar-narrator presenting it to the reader. Thus, Caesar-narrator casts Caesar-character as 
likewise an arbiter of military thought. The character and the narrator appear to be the same. 
This is, of course, fraught with problems, not the least of which is the fact that the two 
roles are distinct (I am reminded again of the distinction between first-person narrator and third-
person character). Moreover, their relationship to the text is different, particularly when we recall 
the two definitions of “narrative” that Genette presents: Caesar-narrator articulates and shapes 
the story while Caesar-character embodies the action of the story. But this attempt to blur the 
distinction between character and narrator is, at times, seemingly successful. In doing so, 
moreover, Caesar-character seems to take on the traits of a narrator: he can appear to exercise 
incredible foresight, for example, almost as if he were an omniscient narrator—a trait that would 
be beneficial for any military commander to possess. As an example, we might look at 2.20.3 in 
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which Caesar has the foresight to tell his men not to stop working on fortifying the camp (here, 
again, following the appropriate action of securing one’s camp) until it is complete: quod ab 
opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat. As 
Tatum 2012: 62 points out, this order demonstrates Caesar’s foresight, which is “crucial to the 
Romans’ success in this crisis” even though they had to defend against the “cunning of the Nervi 
[and] their amazing prowess” which were “not foreseeable.” This appropriation of a narrator's 
traits by Caesar-character is the crux of my reading of Caesar-character’s melding with Caesar-
narrator: Caesar-narrator characterizes Caesar-character just as much as he does the different 
officers. He depicts Caesar-character as undertaking the same actions of success that the officers 
do, but he also lends Caesar-character many of the traits that would typically be reserved for a 
narrator by melding them together in a manner that bolsters Caesar-character’s ability to be a 
general.  
Brown hints at this relationship between Caesar-character and Caesar-general, though he 
does not explicitly articulate it. As Brown writes, “Caesar represents the construction of the 
bridge [over the Rhine] as an extension of his generalship in the field.”81 The actions that Caesar-
narrator depicts Caesar-character doing in the text influence the reader’s understanding of 
Caesar-general. Riggsby does not argue toward the same melding of character and narrator. He 
examines Caesar-character’s and Caesar-narrator’s stances on “theodicy and … barbarism,” 
noting that the character takes a “more morally engaged stand than the narrator.”82 Pelling, in 
contrast, understands a melding between Caesar-character and Caesar-narrator, whom he labels 
he-Caesar and I-Caesar. He reaches a similar conclusion to mine through numerous arguments, 
                                                
81 Brown 2013:46.  
82 Riggsby 2006: 151. For Riggsby’s discussion of the Caesarian voice, see pages 150-155. 
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most notably by investigating the supposed objectivity of the third person voice and the authority 
of both he-Caesar and I-Caesar.83  
The implications of this melding of character and narrator for our understanding of the 
tripartite relationship among the three Caesars are apparent. Caesar-author benefits from a 
characterization of himself as a Roman general who has seemingly omniscient foresight. A 
reader might naturally attribute to Caesar-author those qualities that Caesar-narrator depicts in 
Caesar-character.84 Yet, such an argument needs, by necessity, be posited in a manner that is 
consistent with the historical reality in which Caesar-character existed. That is to say, Caesar-
author cannot hope that his audience would believe that the character depiction of himself 
actually had some sort of magical foresight that allowed him to enact maneuvers that outsmart 
his opponents. The best Caesar-author might be able to argue is that he (depicted as Caesar-
character) contains a unique military instinct that allows him to guess with a degree of certainty 
what might happen so that he might act in such a way that is commensurate with this instinct. 
Yet, there would be nothing keeping other Roman generals from making similar claims. As such, 
Caesar-author must hope that his fellow Romans accept the suggestion that his narrator puts 
forth. The role that Sabinus and Cicero can fulfill, then, is as points of comparison. The narrator 
characterizes both men and their actions in such a way that comparison with Caesar-character is 
inevitable. Where they fall short, he succeeds; where they succeed, he overcomes any potential 
shortcomings; where they meld with narrator in their opinion of how to approach a situation, he 
melds with narrator on a much broader level due to their shared nature as commanders at the top 
of a chain of command. Caesar-author can only benefit from Caesar-character’s successes, and 
this includes his success on the page. Caesar the general (and the author) brought home booty 
                                                
83 See Pelling 2013: 48-57. 
84 The transference of qualities between the different Caesars relies upon a similar implicit characterization that 
Caesar-narrator employs with his officers. As Kraus 2009: 161 puts it, “Caesar pulls back from self-puffery.”  
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from his campaigns, and Caesar-character perpetuates the success of these campaigns through 
his depiction of Caesar-narrator.85 
  
                                                
85 Thus this argument deals with how Caesar-author constructs his reputation. See Kraus 2005: 105 for a look at 
Caesar’s licentious reputation. For an examination of how the narrator of the BC’s military expertise colors the 
characterization of Caesar (the author and historical figure), see Grillo 2011: 253-264. 
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